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Abstract
This paper aims to answer two major conundrums in macroeconomic theory with
regards to the U.S. economy. First, standard macroeconomic models such as Harrod-Domar
and Solow theoryze that factor shares are constant; however, actual measures of the U.S.
labor share have been on a downward trend since the early 1980s. The second conundrum
relates to the Post-Kaleckian wage-led or profit-led view of economic growth. It indicates
that a fall in the labor share in a wage-led economy will result in a fall in aggregate
demand (due to deceases in consumption), and an increase in aggregate demand in a
profit-led economy (due to increases in investment). However, the consumption share of
GDP in the U.S. has been increasing and the investment share has been stable in spite of
the falling labor share.
We argue that the resolution of these conundrums involves reexamining the standard
Keynesian consumption function, both theoretically and empirically. Thus, we propose an
original theory of consumption based on the principles of Duesenberry’s (1949) Relative
Income Hypothesis. We find that the economic consequence of a falling labor share
in the United States is that aggregate demand growth, despite remaining wage-led, has
become increasingly dependent on the accumulation of household debt. Furthermore,
we conclude that there are four ominous outcomes associated with this dependence on
household debt: unstable growth, sluggish growth, stagnation and economic contraction.
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1. Introduction
The primary objective of this project is to identify a set of potential implications that
a redistribution of functional income could have on macroeconomic growth and stability.
Since the early 1980s the United States economy has exhibited a decline in the labor
share alongside a parallel rise in income inequality. However, standard macroeconomic
growth models (Harrod-Domar and Solow) offer no insight into the implications of a
declining labor share since both the functional and personal distribution of income are
taken as constants. Additionally, the implications of the Post-Kaleckian growth model,
which does allow for changes in the function distribution of income, are inconsistent with
the observed trends in wages, consumption and growth. Thus, herein lies two notable
paradoxes of existing growth models.
The first conundrum relates to the behavior of the functional distribution of income by
standard macroeconomic growth models. Standard macroeconomic growth models, such
as the Harrod-Domar Model and the Solow model, take the distribution of factor shares as
constant; however, data for the U.S. labor share show that it has been on a downward trend
since the early 80s. Thus, it is necessary to explore the possible sources of the declining
labor share.
The second conundrum relates to Post-Kaleckian growth literature. Post-Kaleckian
theory concludes that if a country is wage-led then a fall in their wage share (labor share)
will induce an economic contraction led by falling consumption. On the other hand, if a
country is profit-led, a fall in the wage share will lead to an economic expansion through
an increase in investment. The majority of studies have identified that the U.S. economy
is wage-led, but in reality the consumption share of GDP in the U.S. has been increasing
in spite the falling U.S. labor share.1
We argue that the inconsistency between the implications of this model and actual
trends stems from an incomplete view of consumption. the Post-Kaleckian model
assumes a standard Keynesian consumption function, in which households make rational
consumption decisions based solely on their current disposable income. However, we
hold that a more compllete theory of consumption is Duesenberry’s (1949) relative
income hypothesis (RIH). Specifically, the RIH’s theory that individual households make
1Even if the U.S. is profit-led, there has been a disconnect between profits and investment. Furthermore, the pro-fit led
demand regime does not fit actual trends as economic growth in the U.S. is driven by consumption and not investment.
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their consumption decisions based on past consumption behavior (habitual consumption)
and the relative consumption of others (social dynamics of consumption).
Additionally, we argue that technological advances have led the interpersonal aspect of
consumption within modern society to evolve from a localized (microeconomic) effect
to a national (macroeconomic) effect. Specifically, these technological advancements
include mass media (televisions, movies and digitial advertisements) and the internet
(social media, online reviews and online advertisements). Hence, we argue that the
“keeping up with the Joneses” effect that is associated with the standard RIH, has evolved
into the “keeping up with the Kardashians” effect. We also expanded the standard budget
constraint, which only includes current disposable income, to account for both the stock
of past savings (stock of liquid assets) and the supply of consumer credit (debt).
Given the behavioral consumption theory, rising top income levels (worsening income
inequality) resulted in increases in the consumption of households at the top of the income
distribution, which in turn, led low- and middle-income households to increase their own
consumption expenditures. However, due the the declining labor share, the real incomes
of low- and middle-income households have either stagnated or fallen since the early
1980s. Thus, it follows that consumption growth at the bottom required a combination
of dissavings and rising indebtedness. We therefore hypothesize that the declining U.S.
labor share has resulted in a debt-dependent wage-led demand regime. We identify
four potential outcomes of a debt-dependent wage-led demand regime: unstable growth,
sluggish growth, stagnation and economic contraction.
We test our hypothesis using a two-step approach. First, we use a standard VAR model
to test if aggregate demand is consumption-led or investment-led. Our estimation results
are robust and indicate that aggregate demand in the U.S. is increasingly consumption-led.
Second, we conduct an analysis of the behavioral aggregate consumption model using
a Bai-Perron (1998) breakpoint regression. The estimation results are also robust,
and indicate that the role of disposable income of the bottom 90% in determining the
consumption of the bottom 90% has been declining. Conversely, the consumption of
the bottom 90% has become increasingly determined by social influences and consumer
credit. However, relative to each other, the magnitude of disposable income is still the
largest. Thus, the results of our two-step approach indicates that aggregate demand in the
U.S. is wage-led, but increasingly debt-dependent.
The structure of this project is as follows, we presents a multifaceted literature review in
chapter 2. Chapter 3 focuses on behavioral consumption theories. Chapter 4 is dedicated
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to the construction of our two-step approach as well as the results. Lastly, chapter 5
includes the conclusion and policy suggestions.
2. Literature Review
2.1 The Evolution of the Labor Share in the United States
The functional distribution of income refers to the distribution of income between the
two variable income generating factors: labor and capital2. Thus, the labor share and the
capital share measures the share of total income accruing to labor and capital respectively.
While the number of studies involving the functional distribution of income has been
sparse, this topic was highly debated among economists during the 1930s, 40s and 50s
(Giovannoni, 2014b). Part of the debate centered around measuring the factor shares,
while the other focused on the implications of factor shares on economic growth.
In 1928, Charles W. Cobb and Paul H. Douglas published an article titled A Theory of
Production containing what is now commonly referred to as the Cobb-Douglas production
function. Their production function posits that output is determined by total factor
productivity, labor, capital, and the output elasticity of labor and capital. Stated more
formally, the Cobb-Douglas production function is given by the following equation:
Y = ALαK1−α (2.1.1)
Where Y is output, A is total factor productivity (technology), L is total labor input, K
is total capital input, α is the output elasticity of labor and 1 − α is the output elasticity
of capital (Cobb and Douglas, 1928). It can be observed from the output elasticities of
labor and capital that the Cobb-Douglas production function assume constant returns to
scale.3 Given the classical assumption that marginal costs are equal to marginal returns, an
additional implication resulting from the constant returns to scale of the Cobb-Douglas
is that total income is distributed between labor and capital at a constant ratio. Hence,
one major implication of the Cobb-Douglas production function is a constant functional
distribution of income.
The constant returns to scale assumption is also present in the Harrod-Domar model
(Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946). Likewise, due to the use of the Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) production function in the construction of the Solow model (Solow,
2The term variable is used here to indicate that changes in the quantity of labor and capital are possible; in other words,
the total quantity of labor and or capital available is not constricted by an upper limit over the long run. Conversely,
the same does not hold for the third factor of production, land.
3Since the output elasticity of capital is equal to one minus the output elasticity of labor, α+ (1− α) = 1.
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1956), it too assumes constant returns to scale. It follows that, due to the constant returns
to scale assumption, one prominent feature of standard growth models is a constant
functional distribution of income. However, it can be observed in figure 2.1.1 that, since
the 1980s, the constant distribution of functional income feature of these models is at
odds with historical data for the U.S. labor share in the private sector.
Figure 2.1.1: US Labor Share for the Nonfarm Business Sector
Source:BLS (2014)
Since the constant functional distribution of income featured in the standard growth
models results directly from the assumption of constant returns to scale it is possible
to allow for a variable distribution if this assumption is relaxed. However, the overall
conclusion of these growth models remains unchanged even after a variable income
distribution is allowed for. Thus, we must look beyond tradintional economic growth
models in order to impute the theoretical implications of changes in the distribution of
income on economic growth and stability.
2.1.1 Why Has the U.S. Labor Share Fallen
Giovannoni (2014a) provides a survey of studies, and identifies sources of the falling
labor share as: financialization, globalization, technological change and government
2.1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR SHARE IN THE UNITED STATES 15
policies. The concurrent emergance of financialization and globalization were made
possible by advances in technology and changes in government policies. Deregulation of
financial markets allowed the financial sector to expand beyond previous constraints, and
the deregulation of cross-border trades opened up new labor and goods markets abroad.
Meanwhile, the I.T. and communication revolution helped to minimize geographical
constraints. Lastly, Giovannoni (2014b) also identifies rising top income shares as a major
contributor to the decline of the U.S. labor share.
Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2013) highlights four main factors that have
led to the unprecedented rise in top income shares: a reduction in top income tax
rates, changes in the dynamics of labor markets, capital income and the correlation
between earned and capital income. Of the four, the first two factors can be attributed
to distribution policies more directly.
The reduction of top income tax rates effectively increases the after-tax income of top
income earners. Similar to Minsky’s (2008) theory on the effects of retained profits
on investment, given an increase in disposable income, top income earners will have
effectively increased their means to invest and therefore increase their capital income.
The reduction of top income tax rates also an additional indirect effect of increasing
the incentive for top income earners to aggressively seek ways to increase their incomes
(Avaredo, et al., 2013).
Alvaredo, et al. (2013) posits that labor markets in advanced countries have evolved
beyond the traditional supply and demand view. Departing from the labor market
mechanisms that are outlined by the traditional supply and demand view, contemporary
labor markets are characterized by a more individualized wage setting mechanism that
revolves around the bargaining power of labor relative to that held by capital owners. If
true, then the falling labor share may have been, to a certain degree, the byproduct of
deunionization (Giovannoni, 2014a). Since unions strengthen the collective bargaining
power of labor, removing them from the equation results a reduction of the relative
bargaining power held by labor, and an improvement in the (relative) bargaining power
of capital owners; this would in turn result in a relative shift towards profits (Alvarado, et
al., 2013; Giovannoni, 2014a; Stockhammer, 2011a, 2012b).
Technology
The narrative put forth by authors who argue that technology is the main driving force
behind the decline in the U.S. labor share is centered around the notion that technological
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advances following the post war period have been largely capital augmenting. It follows
from this narrative that the ensuing improvements in the marginal productivity of capital
have exceeded the improvements to the marginal productivity of labor. Ergo, under
the neo-classical factor compensation framework, that the emergence of capital-biased
income growth was a direct result of capital augmenting technology (Jacobson and
Occhino, 2012a,b; Berman et al., 1994; IMF 2007).
Moreover, capital-augmenting technological improvements may also lead to a greater
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the production process (Giovannoni,
2014a). This enables U.S. firms to substitute an increasing percentage of their labor
input with capital input whilst maintaining output levels. As a result, there could be a
simultaneous reduction in total labor income (due to lower employment) and increase
profits and capital incomes (due to lower costs and greater employment of capital).4
Financialization and Top Incomes
A major factor that has led to a decline in the labor share of many advanced countries is
the process of financialization. While the term financialization has been used in numerous
studies over the past decade, a precise definition has yet to be reached. Generally, authors
(Epstein, 2001 2005; Giovannoni, 2014a; Krippner, 2005; Palley 2007) have used the
term to denote an increasing weight of the financial sector in the economy. Along these
lines, Krippner (2005) proposes two measures of financialization. The first measure is
the ratio of ”portfolio income” to productive income of non-financial firms. The second
measure would be the ratio of financial to non-financial profits in a given economy. It
follows that a higher value for either measure indicates a higher level of financialization.
Giovannoni (2014a) notes that the share of financial services as a share of the United
States GDP has nearly doubled from 4.9% in 1980 to 8.3% in 2006. In the same study,
Giovannoni also points out that compensation within the financial industry has increased
by 70%.
Authors have generally argued that the process of financialization is initiated by
extensive deregulation of financial markets, labor markets and the flow of capital and
goods across national borders (Hein and van Treek, 2008; Stockhammer, 2012b; van
Treek, 2008). The term financialization commonly entails a change in both financial
4It stands to reason that an increases in the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital would also have resulted
in a deterioration of labor’s bargaining power. Thus, given the labor market theory presented by Alvaredo, et al.
(2013), capital-augmenting technological advances could also decrease the labor share even if employment rates
remain unchanged.
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and non-financial corporate objectives, the increasing role of financial motivations, and a
systematic increase in the size of the financial sector of an economy (Epstien, 2005; Hein
and van Treek, 2008; Giovannoni, 2014a; Stockhammer, 2012b; van Treek, 2008). Under
financialization corporate objectives shift away from the long-term growth, preferred by
managers and workers, towards the shareholders’ preference for short-term profitability
(Guttmann, 2008; Hein and van Treek, 2008).
Giovannoni (2014a) and Guttmann (2008) argue that this shift towards short-term
profitability has been reinforced by increasing the use of stock options and profit-based
performance bonuses in the composition of manager compensation.5 6 Consequently, this
change in the composition of manager compensation has resulted in a departure from the
classic agency theory.
Therefore, it follows that managers compensation has increased significantly7 given the
increase in the use of stock options in manager compensation, and the shift of corporate
objectives from long-term growth to short-term (financial) profitability. Additionally,
corporate profits have also increased substantially during this period as well (Giovannoni,
2014a). However, Palley (2007) finds that wages have stagnated despite the spike in
managerial compensation and corporate profitability. More specifically, the median wage
in the United States has not followed the trend of rising labor productivity. Figure 2.1.2
shows that while hourly compensation has tracked labor productivity, the medium wage
has not. This divergence of hourly compensation from the median wage is highlighted by
the divergence of the real average wage of the bottom 90% from the real average wage of
the top 10% in figure 2.1.3.
Thus, the increased emphasis that has been placed on short-term (financial) profitability,
and the increased use of financial performance-based manager compensation has dual
edged effect on the labor share. On one hand the shift in corporate objectives increases the
level of capital income; on the other hand financialization has also limited wage growth
for the majority of the U.S. workers (the bottom 90%).
Globalization and the Political Economy of Trade Model
A second factor that has contributed to the decline in the U.S. labor share is the rise of
globalization. The United States economy is becoming increasingly integrated into the
5In this context manager refers to high level managers such as chief executives and not low level managers.
6Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) finds that base CEO salaries have decreased from 38% in 1992 to 17% in 2000.
However, during the same period stock options as a share of CEO compensation increased from 24% to 50%.
7This observation is supported by the findings of Avaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2013), and data from the World
Top Income Database.
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Figure 2.1.2: Labor Productivity and Labor Compensation in the U.S.
Source:BLS (2014), U.S. Census Bureau (2014), Author’s Calculations
Figure 2.1.3: Labor Productivity and Labor Compensation in the U.S. Between Income Shares
Source:BLS (2014), WTID (2014), Author’s Calculations
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global economy. Since the 1960s, the exposure of the U.S. economy to international trade
has tripled; the global labor force has increased fourfolds; and by 2005, the United State’s
trade volume with developing countries has surpassed their trade volume with advanced
countries (Giovannoni, 2014a). The majority of literature on the effect of globalization on
income distribution relates to the personal distribution of income rather than the functional
distribution (Harrison, 2005). However, in spite of this notable advancements towards
understanding the nexus of globalization and functional income distribution have been
made.
Rodrik (1998) links each factor’s mobility with their respective bargaining power.
Rodrik posits that factor prices are set within a bargaining framework between labor
owners and capital owners. However, the extent of bargaining power that each factor has
is determined by each factor’s relative mobility so that the factor with greater mobility
also has greater bargaining power. This follows from Rodrik’s argument that the more
mobile factor will be able to relocate to where their returns are highest. In other words, if
capital is the more mobile factor the owners of capital will be able to negotiate for larger
profit margins, and thus lower wages, by threatening to relocate their capital elsewhere if
their terms are not met. Conversely, if labor is the more mobile factor labor owners will be
able to gain the upper hand in negotiating wages by threatening a mass exodus to another
location where their terms will be met. However, due to the reduction in both the physical
and political barriers to trade and international capital flows capital will always be more
mobile than labor. Thus, as of this writing, capital holds a greater degree of bargaining
power relative to labor, ceteris paribus.
The political economy of trade model is the product of merging the insights of Rodrik
(1998) and the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Set in the bargaining power framework
presented by Rodrik, the political economy of trade model posits that globalization
(trade liberalization) benefits the more mobile factor through increased bargaining power
(Onaran, 2011; Stockhammer, 2013). Epstein and Burke (2001) and Stockhammer (2013)
also posit that under the framework of the political economy of trade a redistribution
of income could occur if the more mobile factor threatens to relocate.8 Therefore, the
political economy of trade would suggest that given the rise of globalization that workers
in the U.S. have suffered a relative reduction in their bargaining power while employers
have benefited from an increase in their bargaining power. Consequentially, within the
8Similarly, increasing trade volumes between similar countries could also lead to a redistribution of income during
subsequent negotiations
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wage setting environment employers will use their greater leverage and negotiate for
lower wages.
2.1.2 Measures of the Labor Share
The labor share is is one of two factor shares that makes up the functional distribution
of income (the capital share being the other). Generally, the labor share is defined as the
percentage of total labor compensation in an economy divided by GDP. However, from
the general definition of the labor share we can also derive another method of calculating
the labor share that divides real hourly labor compensation by labor productivity. In other
words,
LS =
Total Labor Compensation
GDP
(2.1.2)
=
Real Hourly Labor Compensation
Hourly Labor Productivity
(2.1.3)
The latter ratio is used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in their calculation of the
labor share. The BLS uses the GDP deflator in its calculation of real hourly compensation.
Apart from the BLS labor share, alternate measures that have been constructed by
a number of authors. Namely, Giovannoni (2014b) constructs a number of different
measures for the labor share in the United States using NIPA data that adjust for various
factors such as the top income shares. Additionally, another term that is used commonly
in place of labor share is wage share. The difference between the two terms lies within
in the numerator of the functions. The equation for the wage share which corresponds to
equation 2.1.2 is:
WS =
Total Wages (Total Labor Income)
GDP
(2.1.4)
Labor compensation equals total wages plus total supplements to labor income. Hence
the difference between the measures of the labor share and the wage share will ultimately
depend on the size of the supplements to labor income.
For the United States, the BLS is the only source for an official measure of the labor
share. Despite its merits, there are considerable shortcomings to the BLS measure. A
major criticism of the BLS method is the lack of transparency (Giovannoni, 2014b). The
method for calculating the labor share listed in the BLS handbook of methods (2014)
is LS=Current-Dollar CompensationCurrent-Dollar Output . Unfortunately, replicating the BLS labor share using this
method is not possible. Furthermore, even though it is possible to replicate the BLS labor
share using the method given in equation 2.1.3; this can only be done using the data
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provided by the BLS. Seeing as the BLS employs a combination of both published and
unpublished data, it would not be feasible to breakdown the data to examine the behavior
of the labor share in a specific sector (Giovannoni, 2014b).
A second crucial criticism of the BLS labor share methodology is that it only
calculates the labor share for the non-farm business sector. The BLS justifies this
decision by stating that the ambiguity of the value-added within the farm, public and
housing sectors. However, by only considering the nonfarm business sector the BLS
is effectively excluding sectors that, together, represent approximately 20% of national
income (Giovannoni, 2014b).
A third criticism of the BLS labor share is that it would not be possible to calculate
the capital share from it. By definition, the sum of the labor share and the capital share
is equal to one. The BLS labor share is indexed on the level of GDP in 2009 therefore
the labor share in 2009, as calculated by the BLS, is equal to 100. Thus, it would not be
possible to derive the capital share from the BLS labor share. However, it is possible to
extrapolate the capital share from alternate measures calculated using NIPA data such as
the measures derived by Giovannoni (2014b).
A final criticism stems from the use of the GDP deflator. The BLS adjusts hourly labor
compensation using the GDP deflator when calculating real hourly labor compensation
(Giovannoni, 2014b). While there is nothing wrong with this method, by using the GDP
deflator the resulting labor share measure provides little insight to the purchasing power
of labor. Therefore, the implications of the falling labor share on the purchasing power of
wage earners is unknown.
2.1.3 Alternative Measures of the Labor Share
This section addresses the shortcomings of the BLS labor share measure.9 One
adjustments is to construct the labor share directly from NIPA data using equation 2.1.2.
The labor share obtained using this method, as represented by the blue line in figure
2.1.4, is relatively stable. One possible explanation is that the NIPA data used in the
calculations includes the public sector, the farm sector and the housing sector, all of which
are omitted by the BLS in their calculations.10 It is highly plausible that these sectors act
9Calculations attributed to Giovannoni (2014b) have been replicated by this author.
10One can presume that the BLS chooses to report data for the nonfarm business sector (as its largest aggregate) in order
to provide an illustration of the capital-labor ratio. Thus the motivation for excluding the housing sector (imputed
rents), public sector (capital is not counted) and farm sector (volatile) is that the ratio is not clear cut within those
sectors. Our analysis is not so much concerned with the capital-labor ratio as with the sources of demand for bottom
incomes. See forthcoming chapters.
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as a ”stabilizing” force on the overall labor share, and that the negative trend observed in
the BLS measure is a result of their omission.
However, Giovannoni (2014b) also suggests that, in addition to the inclusion of the two
omitted sector, one should adjust for top income shares as well. The argument stems from
the notion that income earned by those in the top income share (1%) closely resemble
capital income, not labor income. Thus, their income should be included in the capital
share, and not in the labor share. After adjusting the labor share for labor income earned
by those in the top 1% income share using data from the World Top Income Database
(WTID) the labor share of the bottom 99% is given by the red line in figure 2.1.4.
The NIPA labor share adjusted for the top 1% income share in figure 2.1.4 shows that
the labor share has been falling in the United States. Specifically, it can be inferred that
a major driving force in the falling labor share has been the sharp increase in the share
of income held by those in the top 1%. Yet, while the BLS labor share exhibits a steady
decline in the U.S. labor share during the post war period followed by a sharp collapse
beginning in the early 2000’s; the NIPA labor share adjusted for the top 1% income
share exhibits relative stability throughout the post war period followed by a constant
fall starting in the late 1970’s early 80’s. Thus, two notable implications of this particular
labor share is that: (1) The income earned by labor in the public, farm and housing sectors
have acted as a stabilizing force on the U.S. labor share. Omitting the two sizable sectors
may result in an over exaggeration of the magnitude of the decline in the U.S. labor share,
and its volatility. (2) Income earned by those in the top 1% income share have a similar
effect of ”propping up” the U.S. labor share. Yet, since their income should be categorized
as capital income, their inclusion masks the fall in the U.S. labor share.
The second adjustment that is suggested by Giovannoni (2014b) entails using the CPI
deflator to adjust for inflation instead of the GDP deflator. The motivation behind doing
so would being the ability to interpret the falling labor share in terms of purchasing power.
This adjusted measure for the labor share is represented by the blue line in figure 2.1.5
while the unmodified NIPA labor share is given by the red line. Figure 2.1.5 shows that
while the labor share in the United States has been relatively stable when calculated using
the GDP deflator, the same cannot be said for the labor share after being adjusted for the
CPI. The blue line indicates is that there has been a sizable fall in the labor share in terms
of purchasing power. Adjusting for both top income shares and the CPI, the black line in
figure 2.1.6 paints an even bleaker picture. Since the early 1970’s the U.S. labor share,
in terms of purchasing power, has fallen by over 30 points (nearly half). This indicates
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that in the United States capital owners have benefited from the economic growth at an
increasingly disproportionate ratio compared to labor.
However, the adjusted labor share measures are not without limitations of their own.
The WTID constructs their income shares from tax return data. Since individuals within
the top income shares have greater access to tax loopholes and tax shelters, the WTID
most likely underestimates the size of the top income shares. Consequentially, given this
data limitation, adjusting the NIPA labor share for top income shares with high accuracy
is near impossible. Another, minor, limitation of adjusting for the top income share is
that there will always be a two to three year lag for the most recent top income share
data. this is due to the fact that WTID constructs their income shares from tax return data.
Thus, while it is possible to calculate the NIPA labor share adjusted for CPI up to the
most recent quarter, the same cannot be done when adjusting for the top income share.
Overall, the adjusted labor shares presented in these pages are better understood as our
best estimates given the data limitations.
Figure 2.1.4: NIPA Labor Share for the Entire Economy Adjusted for the Top Incomes
Source: NIPA (2014), WTID (2014), Author’s Calculations
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Figure 2.1.5: NIPA Labor Share for the Entire Economy Calculated Using the CPI Deflator
Source: BLS (2014), NIPA(2014), Author’s Calculations
Figure 2.1.6: NIPA Labor Share for the Entire Economy for the Top Incomes and CPI
Source: BLS (2014), NIPA(2014), WTID (2014), Author’s Calculations
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2.2 Wage-led and Profit-led Demand Regimes
A number of studies have attempted to examine the relationship between an economy’s
functional distribution of income and its economic structure. In this context, the term
economic regime is used to describe an economy’s structure; for example the state of
the capital market and the openness of the economy and its institutions, such as welfare
programs (Stockhammer, 2011a). A country’s economic regime can be analyzed from
either the demand-side or the supply-side depending on the variables being examined.
Following Post-Keynesian theory, the key demand-side variable is aggregate demand;
meanwhile the key supply-side variable is productivity growth (Stockhammer, 2011a).
Hence, determining the nature of a country’s economic regime is a matter of identifying
the sign of the correlation between a change in income shares and the change in the key
variables.
Since it is widely accepted that variations in economic growth are endogenous under a
demand-side view and exogenous under a supply-side view, the vast majority of existing
studies have omitted supply-side considerations (Hein and Vogel, 2008; Onaran and
Galanis, 2012; Stockhammer, 2011a, 2012a; Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer, 2009).
Furthermore, while Stockhammer (2011a) discusses the theoretical properties of wage-led
and profit-led supply regimes he does not conduct any empirical tests. For the purposes
of this paper, we focus on the demand-side as well.
2.2.1 Demand Regimes
For demand to be wage-led, aggregate demand needs to exhibit a positive relationship
with the wage share; in other words, an increase in the wage share must lead to an
increase in the aggregate demand (Hein and Vogel, 2008; Onaran and Galanis, 2012;
Stockhammer, 2011a, 2012; Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer, 2009). This theory is
based off of the Kaleckian assumption that the propensity to consume out of wages is
greater than the propensity to consume out of profits, which implies that the wage share
is positively correlated to the level of consumption. Thus, the narrative is that if there
is an increase in the wage share, then the increase in wages would induce an increase in
consumption expenditure (Stockhammer, 2011a; Onaran and Galnis, 2012).
However, the wage share is also negatively correlated with the level of investment
since it is a function of expected profits (Stockhammer, 2011a). Therefore, in a wage-led
economy, the partial effect of a change in the wage share on consumption will be greater
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than the partial effects of the wage share on investment. Strictly speaking, consumption
is more sensitive to changes in the wage share than investment when the economy is
wage-led (Onaran and Galnis, 2012). Conversely, in the case of a profit-led demand
regime, it should be expected that an increase in the wage share will lead to a decrease
in aggregate demand (Hein and Vogal, 2007; Onaran and Galanis, 2012; Stockhammer,
2011a, 2012; Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer, 2009). As the wage share increases, the
negative partial effect on investment outweighs the positive partial effect on consumption.
Open vs. Closed Economy
It is also possible for aggregate demand to be wage-led in a closed-economy, but
become profit-led under an open economy. Blecker (2002) argues thatin an open economy
international competition and capital mobility decrease the likelihood of wage-led
demand growth. Specifically, the likelihood of aggregate demand being profit-led is
positively related to the degree of price-based competition in domestic and foreign goods
markets and the sensitivity of domestic investment to relative profitability (in relation to
foreign profitability).
This follows from the fact that net exports are also negatively correlated with the wage
share. For any given exchange rate, an increase in the wage share will result in an increase
in production costs and reduce the economy’s international competitiveness (Blecker,
2002; Stockhammer, 2011a, 2011b). Therefore, aggregate demand will be profit-led if
the partial effects on investment and net exports, combined, are greater than the partial
effect on consumption (Blecker, 2002; Onaran and Galanis, 2012; and Stockhammer,
2011a). On the other hand, an economy is wage-led if the partial effect of a change in
the functional distribution of income on consumption is greater than the partial effects on
investment and net exports combined.
However, there are a number of qualifications to be made. First, the relative size of an
economy needs to be taken into consideration as the size of trade and foreign investment
as a share of GDP will be larger for a small economy relative to a large economy (Blecker,
2002). Another consideration is foreign policy. Blecker posits the trade balance and
foreign investment flows of a country with protectionist policies will be relatively inelastic
to changes in the wage share. Furthermore, the effects of price-competitiveness may be
less significant over the long run compared to the short run.
Blecker (2002) qualifies the implications by arguing that they only applies to individual
countries since, as a whole, the world economy is always closed. Similarly, Onaran
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and Galanis (2012) also find that profit-led countries will experience a decline in their
aggregate demand if a major trading partner experiences a decrease in their wage
share. They conclude that this provides evidence that the global economy is wage-led.
Furthermore, they warn that this also serves as evidence that the outcome of a race to the
bottom can only be detrimental as individual gains in competitiveness will be lost if wage
reductions occur simultaneously.
2.2.2 Findings
The findings of existing studies have been mixed. Bowles and Boyer (1995), Hein and
Vogel (2008), Onaran, Stockhammer, and Grafl (2011) and Stockhammer and Stehrer
(2011a) have identified the United States as being wage-led domestically, and remains so
even after allowing for an open economy. Likewise, Onaran and Galanis (2012) also find
that the United States is wage-led when allowing for an open economy. On the other hand,
Naastepad and Storm (2007) find that the United States is profit-led both domestically and
in the open economy. Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) and Barbosa-Filho and Taylor
(2006) also find that the United States is profit-led when allowing for an open economy,
but wage-led domestically.
However, one limitation of these studies is that, despite using different methods and
approaches, they use the private sector which is about 50% of the whole economy
(previous section). Looking at BLS and NIPA data (figure B.1) the observed trends
support neither the wage-led nor the profit-led regime. Theoretically, the falling U.S.
labor share should have been followed by either a decrease in consumption or an increase
in investment. However, despite the falling U.S. labor share, personal consumption
expenditures as a share of GDP have trended upwards. Additionally, figure B.2 shows that
while the falling wage share has coincided with an unprecedented increase in corporate
profits, yet the level of nonresidential investments has not increased as much as the theory
would suggest. Herein lies the two paradoxes of the Post-Kaleckian model:
1. According to post-Keynesian theories we should expect that a redistribution of
income from labor to capital should lead to a decrease in the level of personal
consumption expenditures and therefore act as a drag on aggregate demand. Yet,
historical trends for the labor share and consumption expenditures exhibit a negative
relationship.
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2. Theoretically, the profit share should exhibit a strong positive relationship with real
investment. However, Onaran and Galanis (2012) find that the relationship between
the profit share and real investments is statistically insignificant in the United States.
Similarly, Guttmann (2008) and Hein and van Treek (2008) also identifies this
decoupling of profits from investments.
2.3 Pro-Capital Policies: Financialization and Globalization
One possible explanation for why the data contradicts the theoretical implications of
wage-led and profit-led regimes is the distributional policies that have been implemented
in the United States. Stockhammer (2011a) presents two types of distributional policies:
pro-labor, and pro-capital. Pro-labor distributional policies are policies that lead to an
increase in the wage-share, examples of which include increasing the minimum wage
and strengthening collective bargaining power. Pro-labor policies generally have the
effect of increasing real wages, maintaining a stable wage share, and decreasing income
inequality. Conversely, pro-capital distributional policies generally cause reductions of
the wage share through lowering the minimum wage, weakening collective bargaining
power and employment protection legislation.11
Stockhammer (2011a) argues that while pro-capital and pro-labor distributional policies
are not inherently harmful, pursuing a distributional policy that is inappropriate for the
economic regime could have dire consequences. If a pro-capital (pro-labor) distributional
policy is implemented in a profit-led (wage-led) economy, the reduction (increase) in
the labor share will induce a profit-led (wage-led) growth process. However, pro-capital
(pro-labor) policies implemented in a wage-led (profit-led) regime will lead to either
stagnation, or unstable growth. Furthermore, in this scenerio economic growth will
rely solely on external stimulus when there is a mismatch of economic regime and
distributional policies.
It follows from the findings of Avaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2013) that the
United States has employed pro-capital distributional policies since the 1980s. Since the
1980s the United States has passed extensive tax cuts for those at the top of the income
distribution. Barba and Pivetti (2009) state that the “bonanza” enjoyed by the wealthiest
tax payers in the United States resulted from the belief that capital growth is dependent
on the strength of individual savings. In other words, the pro-capital distributional
11Generally, advocates of pro-capital policies do not campaign to increase capital income directly. Instead they
campaign for wage and labor market flexibility.
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policies enacted in the United States were the result of supply-side, or more colloquially
trickle-down, economics.
In addition to extensive tax cuts, pro-capital distributional policies also created an
environment that facilitated which financialization. Apart from reducing the labor share
(chapter 2.1.1), the increased importance of short-term profitability among corporate
objectives leads to another notable byproduct of financialization: the decoupling of
profits from real (productive) investments (Guttmann, 2008; Hein and van Treek, 2008).
Guttmann (2008) postulates that, given the dominance of shareholder value maximization
among corporate objectives, the commitment and risk associated with undertaking real
investments makes such projects less appealing. Alternatively, firms often choose to
purchase existing productive capacity through acquisitions and mergers. Guttman argues
that this helps to explain the observed trend of stagnant real investment during a period of
historically high profitability.
The decoupling of profits from real investments can be seen in figure B.2. Corporate
profits and nonresidential investments have diverged since the early 1970s. Additionally,
the rate at which this gap grew increased in the mid 1980s and again in the early
2000s. Figure B.2 also shows that corporate profits have become increasingly volatile.
On the other hand the business cycle appears to have a minimal effect on the level of
nonresidential investment.
Another factor that could explain the decoupling of profits and real investments is
globalization. Given the political economy of trade model, the significant opening of cross
border capital flows and both the physical and the political barriers of trade have resulted
in a rise in off shoring of production. Since labor in the United States is generally more
expensive compared to labor in developing economies there is a net export of capital in
the United States. This is to say that profits earned in the United States are not necessarily
invested in increasing the productive output of the United States.
The decoupling of profits and real investments is an issue for the wage-led profit-led
demand regime model. By definition, demand will be profit-led if a redistribution of
income favoring the profit share leads to an increase in aggregate demand through an
increase in investment that outweighs the decrease in consumption. Yet, the sizable fall
of the U.S. labor share has not led to an increase in investment despite monumental levels
of corporate profit.
Conversely, if demand is wage-led in the United States then the falling labor share
should have resulted in a fall in consumption, but this too has not occurred (figure
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B.1). Thus, it can be argued that a decoupling of income and consumption happened
as well. This would indicate that the standard consumption theory based on the marginal
propensity to consume out of disposable income (alone) does not capture the consumption
dynamics, at least in the United States. Thus, alternative theories need to be considered.
2.4 Household Debt
One trend that has become closely associated with the declining labor share (increasing
income inequality) has been the rapid deterioration of the balance sheets of middle- and
low-income households. As shown in figure 3.1.1, the declining labor share has coincided
with a falling personal savings rate, and a concurrent (unprecedented) rise in the level of
private household indebtedness.
A number of authors have identified two channels through which the shift in the
distribution of income has affected the level of household debt in the United States.
The first channel argues that stagnant, and in some cases, falling real incomes for the
majority of U.S. households have led to an increase in the demand for credit (Barba
and Pivetti, 2009; Cynamon, Fazzari and Setterfield, 2013; Cynamon and Fazzari, 2014;
Palley, 2010; van Treek, 2012). The second channel has argued that the rise in household
debt has resulted from an increase in the supply of credit (Barba and Pivetti, 2009;
Coibion, et al., 2014; Cynamon and Fazzari, 2014; Kumhof, Rancie`re and Winant,
2013). Cynamon, Fazzari and Setterfield (2013) argue that the consumption-led demand
regime enjoyed by the United States prior to the Great Recession was financed through
the massive accumulation of debt by households outside of the top income share which
was spurred on by an increasingly deregulated financial sector. Alternatively, Kumhof
and Rancie`re (2011) posits that the doubling of the private credit to GDP ratio in the
United States resulted from the duality of the two channels. The greater reliance on debt
as a supplement to income by households in the bottom 95% was complemented by the
increasing accumulation of wealth of the top 5%.
Furthermore, authors have also identified a number of detrimental macroeconomic
effects of excessive debt accumulation, regardless of the process. Even though the rise in
household debt had occurred over an extended period of time, Barba and Pivetti (2009)
argue that the process of debt-financed consumption is not sustainable. Papadimitriou, et
al. (2014) argue that without a change in the distribution of income the United States
would face two possibilities depending on the debt behavior of households. First, if
households do not begin to finance consumption through acquiring more debt then the
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U.S. economy would face stagnation. Second, if households systematically begin to
finance consumption with debt (again) then the U.S. would face another period of unstable
growth.
2.4.1 The Demand for Debt
The first channel through which a redistribution of income favoring capital owners is
able to affect household debt behavior is through the demand for debt. The theoretical
basis for this line of argument is derived primarily from the works of Veblen (1899)
and Duesenberry (1949). Authors posit that the habitual nature of consumption behavior
and the social dynamics of consumption have led the majority of households to rely on
household debt in order to maintain a relative standard of living.
Barba and Pivetti (2009) argue that households have used debt to supplement either
stagnant or falling real income. The authors find that in the United States, the
majority of income growth between the 1980s and the 2000s accrued to the top of
the income distribution (the top 10%, see also the WTID and Cynamon and Fazzari,
2014). Coincidentally, the rise in household debt has been predominantly concentrated
in low- and middle-income households. Barba and Pivetti (2009) explain that given
Duesenberry’s theory on the habitual nature of consumption, households initially reduced
their savings rate, but after a certain point their consumption expenditures exceeded their
current income. When households needed to consume in excess of their incomes they
relied on the use of either consumer credit or the extraction of equity from their homes.
Authors have also commonly associated the RIH (Relative Income Hypothesis) with
the “keeping up with the Joneses” effect (Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Coibion, et al., 2014;
Palley, 2010; van Treek, 2012). In addition to maintaining their standard of living relative
to their past standards, households also tried to maintain their standard of living relative
to that of others. Thus, rising income inequality (falling labor share) has coincided with
a significant increase in private household debt. Palley (2010) and van Treek (2012)
argue that in addition to consuming out of savings it is also possible under the RIH for
individuals to consume beyond their means through the use of credit. Thus, through the
narrative of the “keeping up with the Joneses” effect, the relative income hypothesis has
been used to explain the rise of private household debt in the United States as a substitute
for wages.
This process of debt-financed consumption has also been referred to as the “Rajan
hypothesis” after Raghuram Rajan’s (2010) book Fault Lines. In his book, Rajan posits
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that U.S. households have responded to the decline in their permanent income by reducing
their savings rate and wealth12 and by increasing debt. The combination of a reduced
savings rate, increasing dissavings and increasing debt holdings has allowed for U.S.
households to temporarily sustain consumption growth despite either stagnant or falling
real incomes.
Iacoviello (2008) also attributes the rise in household debt to the concurrent rise in
income inequality. He creates a general (dynamic) equilibrium model with heterogeneous
agents to study the trend and cyclical properties of household debt. Iacoviello argues the
his model explains why the sharp increases in income inequality was accompanied by a
significantly smaller rise in consumption inequality and a larger rise in wealth inequality.
Specifically, the trends are explained by household borrowing behavior.
At the cross-sectional (micro) level, Iacoviello (2008) argues that the rise in household
debt was a result of households relying on debt as a substitute for real income growth.
Accordingly, he also argues that aggregate debt rises when there is an increase in
income inequality. However, in addition to the “keeping up with the Joneses” argument,
Iacoviello also posits that on the aggregate (macro) level consumer debt behavior is highly
cyclical.
Conversely, in a recent study Coibion, et al. (2014) argue against “keeping up with the
Joneses” and find that the rise in private household debt in the United States was not a
result of increased demand for debt. Using disagregated data from the New York Federal
Reserve Bank Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax (CCP) the authors were able to analyze
the relationship between local inequality and different forms of debt. Their findings
indicate that low-income households in regions with high income inequality borrowed less
compared to low-income households in regions with low income inequality. Furthermore,
the authors also show that the results are robust.
Thus, it would appear that the results of Coibion, et al., (2014) rejects the social
dynamics of consumer behavior posited by Duesenberry’s (1949) relative income
hypothesis and the “keeping up with the Joneses” effect associated with it. However,
the findings of Coibion, et al., (2014) may have resulted from the omission of one major
channel through which an individual’s consumption behavior may be affected by the
consumption behavior of other individuals. In the construction of the RIH, Duesenberry
(1949) posited that the “demonstration effect” may induce an individual’s consumption
expenditure to increase without a corresponding increase in either their income or the
12The accumulation of past savings.
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prices of the goods they consume. When there is an increase in the frequency to
which an individual is exposed to goods superior to those they currently consume that
individual’s impulse to buy the superior good increases as well. Since the majority of
an individual’s “exposure” would have been limited to physical interactions at the time of
Duesenberry’s writing, it would be reasonable to assume that the effect of social dynamics
on consumption is limited to an individual’s local community.
However, in the digital age, with the permeation of mass media and internet access,
contemporary households are not only exposed to local influences, but are influenced
by the consumption behavior of individuals outside of their local community as well.
An individual may be equally influenced by observing the consumption of someone else
indirectly through, for example, a television screen as they would have directly in person.
Furthermore, digital media has also led to an unprecedented rise in the exposure an
individual has to advertisements. Since advertisements are constructed to “demonstrate”
the superiority of the good or service that is being presented, an individual may be
swayed into believing that the goods they currently consume are inferior. Thus, while
it may have been appropriate to use the methods employed by Coibion, et al. (2014) in
1949, restricting the sphere of influence to only include an individual’s local community
is theoretically flawed. In that sense, the phrase “keeping up with the Joneses” is just
as dated; alternatively, a more appropriate term for describing the social dynamics of
consumption in the digital age would be “keeping up with the Kardashians”.
2.4.2 Supply (Availability) of Debt
Common supply-side explanations for the rise of debt have been smaller business
fluctuations, the reduced cost of borrowing, changes in the regulatory environment for
lenders and new technologies that help control credit risk (Iacoviello, 2008). Iacoviello
argues that during good times, the credit constraints imposed on households become
relaxed. In other words, the level of household debt is pro-cyclical. Thus, credit
constraints were significantly relaxed during the run-up of household debt since smaller
business fluctuations meant longer periods of “good times”.
The reduced cost of borrowing came in the form of falling interest rates. Barba and
Pivetti (2009) argue that one of the reasons behind the massive accumulation of household
debt over a relatively long period of time in the U.S. were policies that progressively
lowered the interest rate. As interest rates fell, the costs of servicing debt also fell; and
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since debt servicing costs are the primary cost of financial leveraging, borrowing became
more affordable.
Conversely, by accounting identity, an increase in the interest rate might lead to a
decrease in the creation of new household debt it could still lead to an increase in the
debt-income ratio for households with existing loans. Barba and Pivetti (2009) point
out that even if households decide to keep their consumption expenditures equal to their
current income, if the interest rate is greater than the rate of income growth their their
debt-income ratio will continue to increase. In this scenario, the only way to reduce one’s
debt-income ratio would be for consumption expenditures to fall below current income.
Barba and Pivetti (2009) also find that a significant portion of the rise in household
debt since the 1980s resulted from a growing tendency for households in the low- and
middle-income distribution to extract equity from the value of their homes in order
to finance consumption. Since this channel of borrowing was only made possible by
changes in the regulatory environment for lenders it follows that the rise in household
debt accumilation have resulted, in part, from financial deregulation. Likewise, Cynamon
and Fazzari (2014) posit that asset accumulation explains a substantial portion of the
acceleration in the debt to income ratio for the bottom 95%.13 They posit that the rise
in household debt would not have been possible if not for concurrent asset bubbles, and
argue that an individual’s access to credit is determined in part by their assets and their
ability to maintain their financial net worth.
The increase in the household leveraging of the bottom 95% during the 1990s were
made possible by the stock bubble (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2014). The stock price bubble
allowed those households to maintain their financial net worth. However, after the stock
price bubble burst, it was the housing bubble that helped support further acceleration
of the debt growth of the bottom 95%. Coincidentally, Cynamon and Fazzari (2014) also
finds that when housing is excluded from the net worth of the bottom 95%, their “financial
net worth” fell by more than 40%.
Furthermore, Iacoviello (2008) argues that on the aggregate level, the rise in household
debt resulted from an increase in the allocative efficiency of the U.S. financial sector.
He argues that as a country becomes richer, their financial sector also becomes better
at allocating capital from households who have excess funds to households that need
13Cynamon and Fazzari (2014) dissaggregates the components of the aggregate household balance sheet between the
top 5% and the bottom 95%.
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funds. Complementing Iacoviello’s argument, Kumhof, et al. (2013) argue that the rise
in household indebtedness was enabled by the savings of the rich (capital owners).
Kumhof, et al. (2013) posit that individuals at the top of the income distribution derive
utility from the accumulation of wealth. Specifically, the authors argue that top income
earners exhibit a preference for wealth, and will therefore have a higher propensity to
save. Traditionally, wealth enters the utility function as a representation of two motives:
precautionary saving, and the desire to leave an inheritance. However, Carroll (2000) and
Kumhof, et al. (2013) suggests top income earners are able to derive direct utility from
the social status and power that is associated with wealth.
Therefore, with the rapid rise in income inequality, households at the top of the income
distribution have experienced a significant increase in their annual incomes. Given the
insights of Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) both the savings rate and the wealth of top
income earners have increased significantly as well. Accordingly, the increases in wealth
at the top of the income distribution has in turn lead to an increase in the availability of
credit to the bottom of the distribution through the banking sector.
2.4.3 Debt, Stability and the 2008 Crisis
The robust economic growth in the decades preceding the Great Recession was, by
large, fueled by the strong and sustained growth of consumption expenditures that was
financed by unprecedented household borrowing. Cynamon, Fazzari and Setterfield
(2013) dub this process as “consumption-led and debt-financed engine of aggregate
demand growth”. This period, referred to as the “Great Moderation”, created an illusion
that the pro-capital distributional policies implemented in the early 1980s had resulted in
stable economic growth. However, a number of recent studies have attributed the run up
of household debt as the underlying cause of the Great Recession. Kumhof and Rancie`re
(2011) and Mian and Sufi (2014) identify sharp increases in both income inequality and
debt to income ratio as two major similarities between the Great Depression and the Great
Recession.
Cynamon and Fazzari (2014) find that the rise of inequality was large enough that it
could potentially account for the entire increase in debt leveraging by households in the
bottom 95%. Cynamon and Fazzari argue that the combination of a lower savings rate and
greater indebtedness of households in the bottom 95% lead to increasingly fragile balance
sheets for the bottom 95%. Since households in the bottom 95% derived a large portion of
their “borrowing power” from their assets, the degree of access households had to credit
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and therefore debt growth is severely dependent on asset prices. Likewise, Iacoviello
(2008) finds that the accelerated growth of aggregate debt was a result of households
extracting equity from their housing assets.
During the 2000s the composition of the assets held by the bottom 95% became
predominately housing assets, the health of their balance sheets relied heavily dependent
on housing prices. Cynamon and Fazzari (2014) note that compared to the 1990s the
financial net worth of households in the bottom 95% had dropped over 40%. On one
hand the value of the assets held by the bottom 95% became increasingly volatile, and on
the other hand their liabilities increased at an alarming rate as households increased their
debt. Additionally, households had insufficient savings due to decades of dissaving and
declining savings rates. All these factors would work together to increase the fragility of
the aggregate balance sheet of the bottom 95% (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2014).
Similarly, Mian and Sufi (2014) believe that financial crises are not inevitable, but are
instead the result of a financial system that fosters too much household debt.14 Mian and
Sufi argue that a major function of any financial market should be to help spread the risk
among its users. However, this risk becomes concentrated squarely on the debtor when
a financial system relies on the extensive use of debt by households in order to thrive.
Jorda`, Schularick, and Taylor (2011a) finds that credit growth is the single best predictor
of financial instability. The authors find that prior to a financial crisis credit growth has a
tendency to be greater than usual. In line with the supply of credit argument, the elevated
credit growth is complemented by a tendency for short-term interest rates to be lower than
the “natural rate”.
In accordance with Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, Cynamon, Fazzari and
Setterfield (2013) argue that by the late 2000s economic growth in the United States
became dependent on the “ordinary workings of financial markets” in addition to the
“ordinary workings of goods markets”. In particular, the “ordinary workings of financial
markets” necessitated rolling over existing debt, and expanding new credit. However,
right before the onset of the Great Recession, a significant number of households were
no longer capable of repaying their adjustable mortgages due to rising short-term interest
rates (Cynamon, Fazzari and Setterfield, 2013). This would cause the housing bubble
to burst. Therefore it follows that the concurrent rise in debt-financed consumption and
equity based credit supply resulted in economic growth that became increasingly unstable.
14Jorda`, Schularick, and Taylor (2011b) finds that the expansion of private household debt preceding a financial crisis
is five times greater compared to non-financial crises.
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Furthermore, based on a study of 200 recessions occurring in 14 advanced economies
between 1870 and 2008 Jorda`, Schularick, and Taylor (2011b) find that, compared to
non-financial crises, financial crises are far more costly in terms of lost output. However,
regardless of whether a crisis is financial in nature or not crises that are preceded by
credit-intensive expansions are generally more severe and the subsequent recoveries also
tend to be slower.
The end of the housing bubble effectively cut off the availability and accessibility
of new credit (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2014). In other words, middle- and low-income
households were no longer able to replace earned income with rising home values as
a source of purchasing power. Therefore, the onset of the Great Recession was a
one-two punch. First, rising short-term interest rates devastated the wealth of middle- and
low-income households which in turn limited their ability to borrow. This first blow would
cause the “ordinary workings of financial markets” to cease. As the credit supply shrunk,
households with lower income growth were forced to reduce consumption in order
to satisfy their intertemporal budget constraints. Additionally, Cynamon, Fazzari and
Setterfield (2013) find that the end of the housing bubble also caused solvent households
to consume less as their confidence was diminished. Hence, the second blow would cause
the “ordinary workings of goods markets” to cease.
Thus, Cynamon and Fazzari (2014) posit that the fragility of the balance sheets of
households in the bottom 95% prevented any kind of consumption smoothing during the
Great Recession. Instead, households with fragile balance sheets were forced to reverse
their borrowing and reduce their consumption expenditures. Hence, Cynamon and Fazzari
(2014) argue that, “We have no reason to expect a return to trend for the bottom 95
percent consumption in the absence of another debt bubble or a structural change that
accelerates bottom 95 percent income.” (p.26) This also resonates with the conclusion of
Papadimitriou, et al. (2014) that the U.S. economy will face the grim prospects of either
volatile growth or stagnation if income inequality is not reduced. Similarly, Kumhof and
Rancie`re (2011) conclude that, “Restoring equality by redistributing income from the rich
to the poor would not only please the Robin Hoods of the world, but could also help save
the global economy from another major crisis.” (p.195)
3. Consumption Theories
In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, John Maynard Keynes
(1936) famously wrote, ”The fundamental psychological law... is that men are disposed,
as a rule and on the average, to increase their consumption, as their income increases,
but not by as much as the increase in their income” (p.96). The consumption theory
assumed within the wage-led/profit-led demand model is based on the implications of
this quote. It is assumed that an individual’s disposable income and their level of
consumption expenditures are positively related, and that the share of income used for
consumption decreases as income increases. Additionally, this model also incorporates
the Kaleckian assumption that the MPC of wage income is greater than the MPC of
profit income. Thus, the Post-Kaleckian model implies that since household incomes
fall when there is a decrease in the labor share then consumption should fall too (Hein
and Vogel, 2008; Onaran and Galanis, 2012; Stockhammer, 2011a, 2012a; Stockhammer,
Onaran and Ederer, 2009). However, the relationship between the labor share and the
consumption share of GDP observed in figure B.1 does not support this notion (see
“second conundrum” inference). The consumption share of GDP has increased despite
the concurrent fall in the labor share. This chapter is devoted to alternative consumption
formulations. We present the permanent income hypothesis (along with the life-cycle
theory of consumption), the relative income hypothesis and the relative income hypothesis
(along with other recent theories of consumption), and propose a formulation of our own.
3.1 The Permanent Income Hypothesis
The First consumption theory that departs from Keynesian propensity to consume
argument is Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis (PIH). Friedman argues
that households consume a fixed proportion of their permanent income. Friedman defines
permanent income to be the annuity of an individual’s total lifetime income. Therefore,
under the PIH an individual’s marginal propensity to consume is constant and equal to
their average propensity to consume. In its simplest form, the consumption function
under the PIH can be expressed as,
Cp = cY p (3.1.1)
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where Cp = permanent consumption15, c = MPC = APC and Y p = permanent income.
The PIH implies that an individual’s consumption decisions will be made based
on the annuity of their permanent income, therefore their consumption expenditures
remain constant despite temporary fluctuations in their current income level. Hence,
neither positive nor negative (temporary) shocks to an individual’s income affects that
individual’s consumption expenditure. In other words, when an individual’s current
income is greater than their permanent income the proportion of that individual’s income
that is used for consumption will be lower compared to when their current income is
equal to their permanent income. Conversely, when the individual’s current income is
lower than their permanent income the proportion of their income spent on consumption
will be greater than when their current income is equal to their permanent income.
Similar to Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis, Modigliani and Brumberg’s
(1954) life-cycle theory of consumption argues that individuals will plan their consumption
expenditures and savings over the course of their lifetime. Essentially, Modigliani and
Brumberg argue that an individual will make consumption decisions based on their
expected lifetime earnings in such a way that they would be able to consume at a constant
level throughout their lifetime. The individual will also make saving decisions with the
goal of accumulating enough savings to continue consuming at that level into retirement.
This theory is illustrated by figure B.3. Thus, both the PIH and the life-cycle theory of
consumption contend that the potential effects of deviations of an individual’s current
income from their permanent income will be smoothed out through either a decreased
savings rate or dissavings (using past savings or financing consumption through debt).
Figure B.4 shows that the savings rate in the United States has generally traced the
behavior of the U.S. labor share as calculated by the BLS. Even though the relationship
weakened after the mid-1980s, both the BLS labor share and the personal savings rate are
still trending downwards. Figure 3.1.1 shows that the relationship between the personal
savings rate and the labor share appears to not only hold when using the adjusted NIPA
labor share measure, but is also stronger.16 Thus, the trends observed in figure B.4 appears
to support the premises of both the PIH and the life-cycle theory of consumption that U.S.
households decreased their savings rate as a result of consumption smoothing.
15Friedman (1957) defines current consumption C as the sum of the permanent component CP and the transitory
component CT .
16Since the labor share in figure 3.1.1 is deflated using the CPI it effectively measures the labor share in terms of
purchasing power.
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However, recent studies have found that the shocks to the personal distribution of
income was permanent (DeBacker, et al., 2012; Kopczuk, Saez and Song, 2010; Kumhof,
et al., 2013). Since the consumption smoothing mechanism occurs in response to a
negative transitory shock to an individual’s current income it cannot be used to explain the
declining savings rate when the shock is permanent. Additionally, even if the shocks were
transitory, both the PIH and the life-cycle theory of consumption are unable to explain
the increase in the level of personal consumption expenditures . In fact, consumption
expenditures should not increase under the life-cycle theory of consumption since it
argues that an individual’s consumption expenditure is constant throughout their lifetime.
On the other hand, the PIH suggests that individuals will consume at a fixed proportion
of their permanent income. In other words, while an individual’s average propensity to
consume may increase due to consumption smoothing their consumption expenditures
shouldn’t.
Under the PIH, an individual’s consumption expenditures is able to increase only if
there is an increase in their permanent income. In reality, the declining labor share
indicates that the opposite has occurred for the majority of households outside the top
income share. However, an individual’s current consumption expenditures could increase
if they have a rational expectation that their income will increase in the future. Thus,
Figure 3.1.1: U.S. Personal Savings Rate Compared to the Adjusted NIPA Labor Share
Source:BLS (2014), FRED (2014), NIPA (2014), WTID (2014) Author’s Calculations
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it could have been the case that the growth of top incomes led individuals in low- and
middle-income households to expect that their incomes would increase in the future
as well. As a result of their expectations, these individuals decided to increase their
expenditures. Bertrand and Morse (2013) tests this hypothesis using data from University
of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The authors fail to find any
support for the theory that middle-income households are consuming more due to future
expectations, and concludes that rising top income levels do not predict higher incomes
for middle-income households. Hence, both the PIH and the life-cycle theory are unable
to explain the household consumption behavior observed in the United States.
3.2 The Relative Income Hypothesis
In his book Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior Duesenberry
(1949) argues that there are two fundamental assumptions of the Keynesian consumption
function that are flawed. The first is that an individual’s consumption behavior is
independent from the behavior of others. The second assumption is that an individual’s
consumption behavior adjusts automatically to changes in their income.
3.2.1 The Process of Choice
These assumptions stem from the marginal utility theory (or preference theory) on
which the Keynesian consumption theory is built upon. It theorizes that human desires
are desires for specific goods (Duesenberry, 1949). Alternatively, Duesenberry (1949)
argues that, since all individuals have certain physical and “cultural” needs, individuals
will desire goods that will fulfill a certain purpose. Be that as it may, individuals are
also not indifferent between goods that serve the same purpose. Different goods serving
the same purpose present qualitative differences17 that will make some goods better than
others. Based on their qualitative differences goods (that serve the same purpose) are
regarded as superior or inferior to one another, and are also ranked on a scale of most
to least desirable. A particular good will be considered superior if consumers generally
agree that it is the best means of satisfying a particular need.
Hence, the augmented utility theory proposed by Duesenberry (1949) implies that,
while it is possible for individuals to increase their utility by consuming more of a
17Duesenberry (1949) uses the example of transportation. Even though an individual is able to satisfy their need for
transportation through either walking, taking the subway or taking a taxi the level of utility derived from each good.
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particular good, increases to an individuals utility will often result from consuming
different, higher quality, goods that serve the same purpose.18
Duesenberry (1949) also identifies another criticism of standard utility theory. Under
the standard utility theory consumers are expected to consider all available goods and
services and their respective prices in any given period. After considering all the available
goods and services the consumer is then expected to make a number of simultaneous
rational decisions in order to maximize their utility given their income for the period.
Thus, in any given period an individual’s consumption behavior would be the result of a
systematic budgeting process that is self-contained 19. Duesenberry contends that while
this is possible, it is also highly unlikely.
Seeing the standard utility function as highly unrealistic, Duesenberry (1949) proceeds
to construct a more realistic theory. Given the conclusion that people use goods to either
satisfy specific needs or to perform certain activities, Duesenberry argues that there is only
one variable that individuals consider when making consumption decisions: the quality
of the goods and services used for a given purpose. When an individual desires to fulfill a
need a they must decide the quality of the good required to fulfill the need. Furthermore,
these quasi-independent decisions are made as needs arise and not simultaneously as
suggested by the standard utility theory. Nevertheless, these decisions are not completely
independent of each other as the individual still faces a budget constraint.
Duesenberry (1949) posits that these semi-independent decisions are made not through
rational planning, but are instead the result of learning and habit formation. Specifically,
he presents four elements of the “consumption habit formation process”. First, any
given individual will have basic needs, both physical and social, that will require the
consumption of certain goods to be fulfilled. Second, habits will be formed through
experimental behavior.20 Third, individuals will reflect on the outcomes of their
experimental behavior and may end up regretting certain expenditures. Forth, individuals
will determine a successful consumption behavior when no expenditure is regretted such
that no significant change to their consumption behavior is needed. Thus, an individual’s
consumption decisions are determined habits formed through a process of error and trial.
18The standard utility theory implies that the quality of the good being consumed does not matter, and that individual
are able to increases their utility by consuming a greater quantity of the same specific good.
19Self-contained is used here to describe the notion that an individual will conduct their budgeting procedure based
only their consumption choices, the prices of the good and services available and their income. The individual’s past
consumption behavior
20Individuals will “experiment” by consuming varying quantities of goods that satisfy their needs.
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However, the habitual aspect of consumption behavior does not tell the full story.
Duesenberry (1949) further argues that all individuals have a desire to consume goods
that are of higher quality. Individuals are able to resist the impulses to consume higher
quality goods as their desire to save leads them to feel remorse if they give in to too many
impulses. However, the degree to which the individual is able to resist their temptations
for higher quality also rely on the strength of their desire to save. On the other hand, their
degree of resistance will also be negatively affected by the frequency to which they are
exposed to superior goods. Furthermore, the frequency to which an individual is exposed
to superior goods will increase as the consumption expenditures of others increase.
Thus, Dusenberry (1949) argues that an individual’s consumption habits and expenditures
are able to change without a corresponding change in either their income or the prices
of goods. Within an isolated community with only one consumer the consumption
behavior of that individual and the choices they make are determined by habits; but
within a community with multiple households the consumption behavior of one household
will also have an effect on the consumption behavior of other households. Therefore,
Duesenberry (1949) posits that an individual’s impulse to consume goods of higher
quality will increase and their resistance to these impulses will decrease when the
consumption expenditures of others increase. The effect of the two concurring effects
will be an increase in consumption expenditures at the expense of saving. Duesenberry
(1949) describes this process as the demonstration effect. When an individual consumes
a particular set of goods habitually, they can become increasingly dissatisfied with them
over time as their inferiority is demonstrated by the consumption of superior goods by
others. However, consumption habits are only broken through frequent contact with
superior goods, and not simply the knowledge of their existence.
Another aspect of the social influence on an individual’s consumption habits is the
notion of maintaining one’s self-esteem and determining one’s social status through the
consumption of certain “status” goods. As Duesenberry (1949) argues,
When the attainment of any end becomes a generally recognized social
goal, the importance of this goal is instilled in every individual’s mind by
the socialization process... When this occurs the achievement of a certain
degree of success in reaching the goal becomes essential to the maintenance
of self-esteem. The maintenance of self-esteem is a basic drive in every
individual. (p.28)
Despite the fact that there is an absence of a formal hierarchical class system in the United
States, American society is arguably characterized by a system of “differentiated social
status” (Duesenberry, 1949, p.29). Thus, a generally recognized social goal within the
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United States is being recognized for achieving a relatively high status. Even though
an individual’s occupational success and income plays a major role in determining their
status, a high income alone does not suffice. The attainment of a certain status quo is only
a part of the equation as social recognition is also a major determinant in determining
one’s self-esteem. Hence, an individual will also require a medium through which to
display their occupational success.
Due to their higher quality, an individual’s status can be reflect through consuming
superior goods. However, consuming superior goods will only be able to go so far in
elevating one’s status. An individual will be required to acquire luxury, or status, goods
in order to solidify themselves in the highest social classes.21 However, such goods will
either serve no inherent purpose in fulfilling needs or will be no better than other goods
that serve the same purpose (Duesenberry, 1949).
An example of such a good would be Rolex watches. An individual may justify
purchasing a Rolex over a Timex by arguing that the Rolex is made using superior
materials and handiwork, but a Timex is equally accurate, if not more, in providing
the time. Thus, the true premise for purchasing a Rolex is based on reinforcing one’s
self-esteem and obtaining the status associated with owning a Rolex. Since self-esteem
plays an immense role in determining an individual’s well being it follows that the
acquisition of superior goods, and in certain cases luxury goods, will not only increase
an individual’s standard of living due to their higher quality, but also through their social
implications. Thus, the desire to acquire superior goods and luxury goods is “significantly
strengthened in our society by the characteristics of our social structure.” (Duesenberry,
1949, p.29)
3.2.2 The Relative Income Hypothesis
Given the critique of the Keynesian consumption function Duesenberry (1949)
constructs an alternative consumption function titled the Relative Income Hypothesis
(RIH) which accounts for the social dynamics and the habitual nature of an individual’s
process of choice. Duesenberry posits that an individual’s consumption behavior is by
large a function of the consumption behavior of other individuals (the demonstration
effect) and their prior consumption habits (consumption is inelastic with regards to
reduction in income). Under the RIH, an individual’s income acts as a limit to the size of
21The acquisition of luxury goods will not only play a significant role in displaying the superiority of one’s social status,
but will also be far more effective in maintaining their self-esteem.
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their consumption expenditure. However, this is not to say that an individual is not able
to consume more than their current income. Duesenberry argues that it is also possible
for individuals to consume more than their current income through either dissaving or
borrowing; but the extent to which an individual is able to finance their consumption
through past savings and debt is determined both directly and indirectly by past income
levels.
Therefore, similar to the PIH, the RIH argues that due to the habitual aspect of
consumption behavior an individual’s consumption expenditures can remain constant
despite a fall in their current income. However, unlike the PIH, under the RIH the
influence of social dynamics make it possible for an individual’s consumption expenditure
to increase even if incomes and prices remain unchanged. Furthermore, the RIH differs
from the PIH and the life-cycle theory of consumption as individuals are able to consume
beyond their means (when an individual’s consumption expenditures exceed their income)
by consuming out of their existing savings. Also, under the PIH individual’s are assumed
to be rational forward looking agents whereas the RIH presents individuals as being
retrospective.
Accordingly, it appears as though the trends observed in figure 3.1.1 can be explained
through both the permanent income hypothesis and the relative income hypothesis.
Households and individuals have reduced their savings rate as a result of the continued,
and permanent, decline in the labor share. When the share of purchasing power accruing
to labor began to noticeably decrease in the late 1970s, consumers responded by reducing
their savings rate in order to maintain their consumption levels. Fluctuations in the savings
rate occurred as individuals adjusted their consumption behavior while undergoing a habit
forming process. The PIH would interpret the shocks in the personal savings rate to
be dissaving by households during recessionary periods and increased savings during
expansionary periods due to households replenishing their savings. On the other hand,
the RIH narrative would interpret the negative shocks in the personal savings rate as
momentary lapses in an individual’s resistance to increasing their expenditures at the
expense of their savings rate; and, spikes in the savings rate may have represented remorse
towards their increased expenditure in past periods.
However, when looking beyond short run trends, the PIH is unable to explain the
sustained decline in the personal savings rate since the late 1970s early 80s. Conversely,
the negative medium and long run trend of the personal savings rate observed in figure
3.1.1 could be explained by the RIH. Despite the significant reduction in the purchasing
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power of the labor share, individuals are still subject to physical and cultural needs.
Since an individual’s consumption behavior is habitual, a decision is made to reduce their
savings rate instead of reducing either the quality or quantity of the goods they consume.
Additionally, unlike the PIH, the RIH is able to explain not only the increased
average propensity to consume (reduced savings rate), but the increase in the level of
consumption expenditures as well. Bertrand and Morse (2013) finds that the rise of
top income levels between 1980 to 2005 corresponds with an increase in the supply
of “rich” goods (superior goods). It follows that increases in the supply of superior
goods increases the frequency individuals from low- and middle-income households are
exposed to goods superior to the ones that they were currently consuming. In turn, the
increased exposure to superior goods erodes the utility the individual derives from their
existing consumption set. This increases the individual’s impulse to consume goods of
higher quality and reduces their resistance to such impulses. The resulting change in
the consumption behavior causes the individual’s consumption expenditures to increase
since it is reasonable to assume that the price of superior goods is greater than that of
inferior goods. Thus, the demonstration effect can be used to explain the increases
in consumption expenditures among low- and middle-income households that occurred
since the late 1970s early 80s.
3.3 Conspicuous Consumption: The Emulation Effect
The social dynamics of consumption is also emphasized by Veblen (1899). Similar
to the argument put forth by Duesenberry (1949), Veblen posits that in advanced
economies22 the motivation for consuming a particular good or service is not limited to
fulfilling one’s physical needs. Instead, consumers also consume goods in order to fulfill
their “higher wants”. 23 Furthermore, economies with social classes and private property,
individuals derive self-esteem from the accumulation of wealth, and that individuals
display their wealth through the goods and services that they consume. Veblen uses the
term “luxury goods” to describe goods and services that are consumed primarily for their
prestige and status value, and conspicuous consumption as the act of consuming such
goods and services.
22Veblen (1899) defines an advanced economy as one where subsistence is easily achieved such that a majority of the
economy’s population is able to be exempt from the production of food.
23Veblen’s (1899) “higher wants” are the equivalent of Duesenberry’s (1949) “cultural needs”.
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Veblen (1899) argues that through the process of industrialization and the gradual
disappearance of formal social classes an informal social hierarchy has emerged in
advanced economies were individuals have the right to own private property. An
individual’s wealth has usurped official titles as the most recognizable evidence of one’s
success and social status. Accordingly, Veblen (1899) posits that,
Since the consumption of these more excellent goods is an evidence of wealth,
it becomes honorific; and conversely, the failure to consume in due quantity
and quality becomes a mark of inferiority and demerit. (p.53)
Therefore, Veblen argues subsistence and physical comfort never plays a considerable role
in consumption decisions for the majority of individuals within advanced economies.24
Therefore, in an advanced economy with private property the motive for consumption,
and the incentive for accumulating wealth revolves around a status-seeking motive.
Under this framework an individual’s success is therefore measured by the quantity
and quality of the goods they consume; however, their relative success and position in
the informal social hierarchy is determined through comparisons with the consumption
expenditures of those around them. This is the basis of the emulation effect. An
individual is motived is to achieve the highest social status possible through the
conspicuous consumption of luxury goods with the frame of reference being other
consumers that they come into contact with. In order to improve their perceived social
status an individual must emulate the consumption behavior of those ranked higher than
them. Simultaneously, all individuals are also at risk of moving down the hierarchy if
they fail to increase their own consumption when the consumption of others, equal or
lower in rank, increases. Hence, both conspicuous spending and the emulation effect is
characterized by competitive consumption.
Comparing the Demonstration Effect and the Emulation Effect
The positive relationship between top income levels, the supply of “rich” goods”
and the consumption expenditures of low- and middle-income households can also be
explained by Veblen’s emulation effect. In this scenario, top income earners responded
to their higher incomes by increasing their conspicuous consumption which, in turn,
led to an increase in the supply of luxury goods as well. Given the social (status)
implications attached to luxury goods, the increase in conspicuous consumption had the
added effect of widening the perceived social status gap between those belonging to the
24Veblen (1899) acknowledges that there are exceptions to this rule as even the most advanced and prosperous economy
will still have individuals, at the bottom of the income distribution, whom consume purely to provide subsistence.
48 CHAPTER 3. CONSUMPTION THEORIES
top income share and those who are not. Consequentially, in order to keep up with top
income earners and reduce this gap individuals from low- to middle-income households
increased their own consumption expenditures to emulate the consumption behaviors of
the top income earners. Hence, both the demonstration effect and the emulation effect
explains the mechanism through which increased consumption at the top of the income
distribution induces increased consumption throughout the rest of the distribution using
social dynamics. However, even though both narratives appear to be nearly identical there
are subtle, but import, differences.
First, the basis of the emulation effect is a competition between individuals over
social status through conspicuous spending. Veblen (1899) posits that individuals at
the top of the social hierarchy are motivated to spend more in order to maintain their
position, whereas others are incentivized to increase their spending as to emulate them
with the hopes of improving their own status. In the case of Duesenberry’s (1949)
demonstration effect, even though certain goods convey status and helps to bolster
the consumer’s self-esteem, the predominant channel through which social dynamics
affect an individual’s consumption behavior is the frequency to which the individual is
exposed to superior goods. In other words, the mechanism through which top income
consumption affects the consumption of others is not so much based on status-seeking,
but rather frequency of exposure. Therefore, even though both theories posit that an
individual’s consumption behavior is a function of the ratio of their own expenditures
to the expenditures of others they come into contact with the competitive nature of
conspicuous consumption that underscores the emulation effect is absent under the
demonstration effect. Furthermore, whereas the emulation effect implies that individuals
respond with almost instantaneously, even if it is an isolated incident, to the consumption
of others. However, the demonstration effect requires repeated exposures with relatively
great frequency.
Second, there is also a discrepancy in the nature of the goods covered by the
two theories. The interpersonal comparisons hypothesized by Veblen (1899) pertain
exclusively to luxury goods, and the only difference between two luxury goods that serve
the same purpose is the level of status attached to each good. These goods are also present
in Duesenberry’s (1949) demonstration effect and are alluded to as status goods. However,
unlike the emulation effect, the demonstration effect goods serving the same purpose can
also be based on quantifiable differences in quality. Thus, in addition to status goods
there are also superior goods. What’s more superior goods can also be non-status goods.
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For example, with a few exceptions, there is little prestige attached to one’s primary
education; yet a parent whose children are currently enrolled in school a may wish to
send them to school b if the superiority of b over a demonstrated to them repeatedly.
Thus, it follows that even without any status based incentives interpersonal comparisons
can induce an individual to change their consumption behavior if the inferiority of the
good they are currently consuming is demonstrated by the consumption of superior goods
by others.
Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that a superior good conveys a greater degree
of status than the respective inferior good. It is even possible for an individual to switch
from a good that is associated with a greater degree of status to one that is lower in
status. Take for example an individual residing in Manhattan that decides to trade in their
luxurious Range Rover SUV for a Toyota Prius. Even though the Range Rover is far
more prestigious than a Prius it is also inferior to it in a number of quantifiable measures
such as fuel economy, reliability and maneuverability. Through repeated exposure to
the superiority of the Prius, the owner of the Range Rover may become increasingly
dissatisfied with their current vehicle despite the status associated with it. Hence, the
demonstration effect allows for the possibility of a step backwards in terms of status
whereas the emulation effect does not.
3.4 Recent Advances in Behavioral Consumption Theories
Recent studies have attempted to explain the paradoxical relationship between incomes
and personal consumption expenditures observed in low- and middle-income households
in the United States by reexamining the social dynamics of consumption put forth by
Duesenberry (1949) and Veblen (1899). A number of these studies use the principles
of the emulation effect and the demonstration effect casually in order to identify the
link between the rise in income inequality and the rise in household leveraging among
low- and middle-income households in that preceded the Great Recession (Barba and
Pivetti, 2009; Iacoviello, 2008; van Treek, 2012). However, there have also been attempts
to employ the theories of Duesenberry and Veblen in the construction of alternative
consumption theories. This includes the relative permanent income hypothesis (RPI) by
Palley (2008), trickle-down consumption by Bertrand and Morse (2013) and expenditure
cascades by Frank, Levine and Dijk (2014).
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3.4.1 The Relative Permanent Income Hypothesis
Palley’s (2008) RPI is a synthesis of the consumption theories of Keynes, Duesenberry
and Friedman. Palley combines the three theories by amending Keynes’ fundamental law,
...men are disposed, as a rule and on the average, to increase their consumption
as their permanent income increases. The share that they spend out of
their permanent income depends on their relative permanent income, and the
greater their relative income the smaller that share. (p.6)
Palley then constructs an individual household consumption function, and the corresponding
MPC function based on the restated fundamental law,
Ci,t = c
(
Yi,t
Yt
)
Yi,t (3.4.1)
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where Ci,t = consumption of household i in period t, c
(
Yi,t
Yt
)
= the marginal propensity
to consume, Yi,t = disposable permanent income of household i in period t and Yt =
average disposable permanent income in period t.25 Equations 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 assumes
that there are only two types of households (low-income and high-income) and that there
is no income uncertainty, such that actual income is equal to permanent income.
Palley’s (2008) consumption function (equation 3.4.1) bears a strong resemblance to
the consumption function under the PIH, but due to the differences in the MPC the
implications are drastically different. Whereas the MPC is constant under the PIH, the
MPC in equations 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 depends on the household’s disposable permanent
income relative to the average disposable permanent income. This implies that a change
in the average permanent disposable income can cause an individual’s MPC to change
without a corresponding change in their own permanent income. Similarly, it is possible
for an individual’s consumption to remain constant despite an increase in their income
if their relative income position is increased. Thus, Palley argues that an individual’s
MPC and RPI are negatively related. An improvement in an individual’s RPI will result
in a decreased MPC, whereas a deterioration of their RPI will induce an increase in their
MPC.
It follows that a rise in income inequality will lead individuals from high-income
households to experience an increase in their income relative to the incomes of
25Where i=1,2 and 0 < c
(
Yi,t
Yt
)
< 1, c′ < 0, c′′ > 0 or c′′ < 0 (Palley, 2008).
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low-income households.26 However, the effect of widening inequality on aggregate
consumption will depend on the shape of the MPC curve. Palley (2008) derives the
following equation for the aggregate consumption function,
Ct = qc
(
a
[1 + qa− q]
)
aYt
[1 + qa− q] +
[1− q] c
(
1
[1+qa−q]
)
Yt
[1 + qa− q] (3.4.3)
where a = relative income parameter, q = household composition parameter and Yt =
exogenous average income.
In the case of a strictly concave MPC, Palley (2008) posits that widening inequality
will lead to the gap between the two groups MPC such that there is a fall in the
average (weighted) MPC. In turn, this will result in a fall in aggregate consumption
expenditures. Hence, if the MPC curve is concave, widening inequality is bad for
consumption. However, Palley argues that if the MPC is convex then there is a tendency
for widening inequality to raise the average MPC such that the net effect of widening
inequality on aggregate consumption is mitigated. Consequentially, if the “keeping up
with the Joneses” effect is strong then widening income inequality could, in theory, also
lead to an increase in aggregate consumption expenditures as well.
Critique
The formulation of the RPI was timely to say the least. At the time of conception,
the prevailing consumption theories employed by most economists were at odds with
the actual consumption behavior observed among the majority of American households.
By integrating Duesenberry’s RIH into the consumption theories put forth by Keynes
(1936) and Friedman (1957), Palley (2008) was able to introduce the behavioral aspect of
consumption into a familiar framework. However, while the RPI is an intriguing take on
the consumption theories, representing a much needed departure from the consumption
theories employed by most economists towards one that places a greater emphasis on the
behavioral aspect of consumption, it is not without fault.
The first criticism involves the use of Friedman’s PIH, specifically the method of
measurement. In order to calculate an individual’s permanent income one would need
to be able to predict their lifetime income since permanent income is, by definition, the
annuity of their lifetime income. Palley (2008) accounts for this by assuming that there
is no uncertainty in regards to one’s income such that an individual’s actual income is
26In other words, the relative income of high-income households increases while the relative income of low-income
households decreases.
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equal to their permanent income. Given that assumption, we question whether or not it
is even necessary to use permanent income if it is assumed that it is equal to current
income. Furthermore, in its strictest form, permanent income is constant over one’s
lifetime. Hence, it would not be possible for an individual’s permanent income to fluctuate
over time in the manner posited by the RPI.
The second criticism has far greater implications and involves the fundamental
mechanism through which one’s consumption is affected by others. Palley’s (2008)
incorporates Duesenberry’s (1949) RIH into the RPI in the form of c (Yi,t/Yt). This implies
that an individual’s consumption behavior is influenced by the income of others rather
than the consumption of others. This is a critical misinterpretation of the demonstration
effect, and therefore the RIH. It is our belief that an individual’s consumption behavior
will not be affected by changes in the income of others alone. While an individual’s
consumption behavior may be affected indirectly by changes in the incomes of others as
it leads to either changes in the consumption expenditures of others or the availability of
“luxury goods” (Bertrand and Morse, 2013), a direct income effect is highly improbable.
3.4.2 Expenditure Cascades
An alternative behavioral consumption function has been suggest by Frank, et al.
(2014). The theoretical basis of expenditure cascades is that changes in the spending
of one income group shifts the frame of reference that defines consumption standards
for others just below them on the income scale. This shift results in changes in the
consumption expenditures by the second group which will again shift the frame of
reference for the third group (others just below the second group on the income scale), and
so forth. As a result, this chained effect gives rise to expenditure cascades (Frank, et al.,
2014). Hence, the model that underpins the expenditure cascades theory implies that the
evaluative judgements of any given consumer depends heavily on context and relativity.
This is again a departure from the traditional models of consumption that assumes that
the consumption of each individual is completely independent of the spending of others.
Based on this idea, Frank et al. (2014) hypothesize that, in the United States, the
observed decline in the personal savings rate is a result of growing income inequality.
Accordingly, the authors present a original consumption function in the form of,
Ci = k(1− α)Yi + αCi+1 (3.4.4)
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where Ci = current consumption of the ith consumer, Yi = the permanent income levels
of the ith consumer, k = parameter unrelated to permanent income or rank, α = the extent
of influence the consumption of others have and Ci+1 = the current consumption level of
the individual whose permanent income ranks above i’s.
The expenditure cascades theory has two major implications. First, the comparisons
that matter the most are highly localized in time and space. Second, people generally
look to others above them on the income scale rather than those below them. Unlike
Palley’s (2008) RPI, the mode of comparison in the expenditure cascades theory is based
on consumption expenditures instead of permanent income. Additionally, the notion that
individuals compare themselves to others above them on the income scale echoes the basis
of Veblen’s emulation effect. However, Frank, et al., (2014) admit that a more realistic
model would allow explicitly for the possibility that consumers are influenced by others
more distant from them. We shall return to the idea of expenditure cascades in section
3.5.
3.4.3 Trickle-Down Consumption
Similar to the conclusions of Palley (2008) and Frank et al., (2014), Bertrand and Morse
(2013) argue that the MPC of middle-income households will increase when exposed to
higher income and consumption at the top of the income distribution. However, unlike
the two aforementioned studies, Bertrand and Morse rely mostly on data gathered from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the period of
1980-2008. Consequentially, due to the nature of survey data, Bertrand and Morse’s
study is strictly microeconomic; thus their study focuses on the effect of widening income
inequality on personal consumption expenditures at the household level. Conversely, the
studies of Palley and Frank et al. are macroeconomic in nature, and are therefore focused
on the effect of widening income inequality on aggregate consumption expenditures.
Additionally, whereas Palley and Frank et al. focus on constructing a single model
Bertrand and Morse tackle a number of different, but interrelated, questions regarding
household consumption.
The first hypothesis that Bertrand and Morse (2013) tests is Friedman’s (1957) PIH.
Specifically, the authors test the theoretical argument that the rise in top income levels
led individuals from middle-income households to form a rational expectation that their
incomes would rise as well in the future, and increased their consumption accordingly
based on this expectation. Using data from University of Michigan’s Panel Study of
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Income Dynamics (PSID) the authors fail to find any evidence that would support this
line of argument. Likewise, the authors also fail to find evidence that rising top incomes
lead low- and middle-income households to take on more optimistic views of the future.
Furthermore, the PSID data also fails to provide evidence supporting the precautionary
savings motive explanation.
The authors then turn to behavioral explanations. The first theory Bertrand and Morse
(2013) test is, in essence, the habitual nature of consumer behavior of Duesenberry’s
(1949) RIH. The authors argue that it is possible that consumers with strong habitual
consumption patterns maintained their consumption composition even if prices increased
and incomes remained stagnant. The authors find evidence indicating that top income
levels are positively correlated with the CPI. However, the relationship between
top income levels and middle-income household consumption still holds even after
controlling for the CPI. Thus, the authors argue that while the habitual nature of consumer
behavior may have played a role in the observed trend it is not the definitive cause.
Bertrand and Morse (2013) then consider other behavioral explanations. One possible
explanation is that rising top income levels led to an increase in the effect of social
comparisons on consumption. This line of argument is consistent with the theories put
forth by Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949) and Frank et al. (2014). This is similar to
the social comparison argument, but involves the supply of luxury goods (whereas the
former involves the demand for luxury goods). The authors argue that, within a given
market, the supply of luxury goods is positively related to top income levels such that
rising top income levels will induce an expansion in the supply of luxury goods. In turn,
an increase in the supply of luxury goods will lead to greater consumption expenditures by
middle-income households within that market. The authors finds evidence that supports
both of the above theories using data gathered from the CEX. However, the results testing
the supply of luxury goods theory were more robust than the results obtained from testing
the social comparison hypothesis. Thus, the authors argue that, on the microeconomic
level, the supply of luxury goods has a larger effect on the MPC of middle-income
households.
Additionally, Bertrand and Morse (2013) also present two qualitative measures that can
be used to not only identify whether or not a good is a luxury good or not, but can also
be used to measure the extent to which a good is a luxury good. These two measures
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are income elasticity and the visibility of the good.27 A luxury good is therefore a good
that is both income elastic and highly visible, and the degree of luxury a good possesses
is positively related to the income elasticity and visibility of the good. Accordingly, the
authors’ results indicate that the positive change in their budget shares28 middle-income
households undertake in response to higher top income levels will be greater for goods
and services that are more income elastic and more visible.
For example, Bertrand and Morse (2013) find that a 10% increase in the variation in
top income levels increases29 the budget share of middle-income households dedicated
to shelter by 5%. Conversely, the same increase in the variation in top income levels
led to middle-income households reducing the budget share dedicated to education by
11%. Therefore, the authors argue that the increase in consumption by middle-income
households may be the result of increases in the supply of luxury goods within their
market, and a desire to emulate the consumption of their richer co-residents through
visible consumption spending.
Bertrand and Morse (2013) also test the hypothesis that expansions of the credit
supply enabled individuals from middle-income households to increase consumption
expenditures based on their behavioral response to rising inequality. The authors
find indirect evidence supporting the hypothesis that consumers from middle-income
households relied on their greater access to credit, as a supplement to their earned income,
in order to “keep up with the Joneses”. The findings also suggest that the use of credit
was greater among middle income households living in (closer) proximity to top income
earners.
3.5 Reconsidering Consumption Theories
The observed trends in consumer behavior, specifically the behavior of low- and
middle-income households, since the early 1980s bare a close resemblance to the
behavioral consumption theories put forth by Duesenberry (1949) and Veblen (1899) than
the standard consumption theories of Keynes (1936) and Friedman (1957). However, the
works of Duesenberry and Veblen are not perfect. The relative income hypothesis and
the theory of conspicuous consumption preceded the conformation of mass media and the
27The term visibility is used here to indicate the degree of social recognition a consumer receives from using a particular
good (Bertrand and Morse, 2013).
28The share of disposable income allocated to the consumption of a particular category of goods (Bertrand and Morse,
2013).
29Converting the top income level variable into log form and then taking the differences (Bertrand and Morse, 2013).
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financialization of the U.S. economy. Palley (2008), Frank et al. (2014) and Bertrand
and Morse (2013) maintain that the effect of rising top income levels on the consumption
behavior of individuals from low- and middle-income households only occurs through
direct contact, and is therefore a strictly local phenomenon.30 Moreover, while Bertrand
and Morse entertained the notion that increased consumption expenditures among low-
and middle-income households was financed in part by debt, the implications of an
advanced credit market have yet to be examined in depth.
We argue that in order to improve the accuracy of behavioral consumption theories
significant modifications are needed to account for recent developments in mass media
and financial markets. Specifically, there are three notable modifications that are to
be made. First, due to the introduction of digital media, the frame of reference for
consumption standards is no longer confined to physical proximity. Therefore, consumers
compare their own consumption expenditures with others on a national basis, if not
international, instead of a local basis. Second, innovations in advertising and branding
have made it so that the demonstration effect can occur through both direct and indirect
exposure to goods that are perceived to be superior. Third, an individual’s access to credit
enters the consumption function as a supplement to income. Accordingly, this theory will
be broken down into two parts: first a revision of the theory on behavioral consumption
behavior and second the role of wealth and unearned income in consumption decisions.
3.5.1 Keeping Up with the Kardashians
In their original form, Veblen’s (1899) emulation effect and Duesenberry’s (1949)
demonstration effect are both local effects; hence the influence of a top income earner’s
consumption behavior is confined to only those within their local community. Thus
it follows that an individual’s frame of reference is limited to an individual’s local
community. For example, the emulation effect implies that it is possible for an individual
to be at the top of the social hierarchy when their frame of reference is limited to their local
community, but, holding everything else constant, their status could fall to the middle of
the social hierarchy when their frame of reference is expanded. Similarly, in the case
of the demonstration effect, a good that is considered to be the most “superior” within a
local community may be inferior to a number of goods when exposed to comparisons on
a national level.
30While Frank et al. (2014) acknowledges that, realistically, consumers can be are influenced by the consumption
of others outside of their local community, their model maintains the implied assumption that consumers are only
influenced by those within their local community.
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The localized nature of comparative consumption that underscores the two effects is
the result of the assumption that the interpersonal comparisons affecting consumption
decisions pertains exclusively to direct, physical, social interactions. Thus, both theories
imply that an individual will only emulate and compete with others of whom they have
personal relationships with.31 Conversely, it is our belief that in addition to direct contact
with the consumption of others, both the emulation effect and the demonstration effect
can occur through indirect contact as well. This is to say that comparative consumption
can occur through both interpersonal and impersonal exposure to either status goods or
superior goods.
The mediums through which impersonal exposure occurs is ever growing. Coincidentally,
the magnitude of the effect impersonal exposure has on consumption decisions also
grows as each medium becomes increasingly advanced. In particular, a number of
notable examples of media content through which impersonal exposure to superior goods
occurs are: advertisements, television programs, movies and various forms of internet
content.32Furthermore, with the exception of advertisements33, these mediums are also
universal in nature. The contents of a particular television program, movie or website
seen by an individual in California will be identical to the content seen by an individual
in New York.
Conversely, it could be argued mass media is not a new phenomenon. Advertisements,
televisions and radio programming had all existed at the time of Duesenberry’s (1949)
writings. Moreover, Duesenberry posited himself that simply knowing about a superior
good was not enough to induce a change in an individual’s consumption habits. However,
the mass media of yesterday is not equal to that of today. Most importantly, technological
advancements have enabled the visual stimuli of these mediums to become near lifelike.
Therefore, all four mediums have benefited from constant innovations that have allowed
the mediums to become increasingly realistic and therefore relatable. Furthermore,
technological advances have also led to significant reductions in the cost of accessing
these mediums as well. It follows that, given the increasing accessibility and realism
of these mediums, it can be argued that individuals are able to empathize and form
31Personal relationships is used fairly liberally in this context. The term encompasses relationships that range anywhere
from close friends to casual acquaintances.
32”The American Time Use Survey” that is conducted by the BLS found that 79.4% of Americans watched on average
2.77 hours of television per day. Similarly, for the same year, the U.S. Census Bereau’s “Computer and Internet Use”
survey found that 83.8% of American households owned computers and 74.4% had internet access.
33It is common for companies to tailor advertisements for specific markets, and not all advertisements are broadcasted
nationally.
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relationships with others even without any direct personal interactions. Moreover,
this bond can just as easily induce the consumer to undergo impersonal consumption
comparisons as well.
Advertisements, Television Programs and Movies
The fundamental role of advertisements is to sell the goods and services that they
promote. Cochrane and Bell (1956) note that advertisements informs consumers of the
availability of a new good or service through exaggerated depictions as a purposeful
method of creating wants. However, Cochrane and Bell also posit that the goal of
advertisements is not always to increase the overall size of the market,
The nature of advertising, moreover, shows that it is designed to get the
firm a larger share of total sales rather than to expand total demand and
sales. Hence, most advertising emphasizes product differences and reinforces
nonprice competition. (p.386)
Thus, it can be argued that the effect of advertisements is essentially a demonstration
effect of sorts. In other words, through frequent exposure an advertisement for good A
has the potential of convincing its viewers that their product is superior to the one they are
currently consuming. In turn, the perceived superiority of good A will reduce the utility
the viewers derive from their current consumption, thus inducing the viewers to switch to
good A.
Additionally, advertisements may not be explicit, and can come in the form of
product placements in television programs and movies. In this instance, the effect of
advertisements can be a combination of the demonstration effect and the emulation effect.
On one hand, audiences that are exposed to the use of a particular product placed within
visual media may believe that the specific product is used due to its superiority to similar
products. On the other hand, audiences may feel an urge to purchase the product in order
to emulate the character that uses it. Similarly, advertising can also come in the form of
celebrity endorsements. In this case, fans of the celebrity may be induced to purchase the
product in order to emulate them.
There has also been an evolution in the nature of television programing as well. Even
though traditional programing is still prevalent there has been an emergence of reality
television. These shows had led to further ambiguity in the line that separates real
interpersonal relationships and impersonal relationships between the cast of television
shows and their viewers. Unlike traditional television programing, reality shows offer
greater intimacy and insight into the lives of the cast members.
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Accordingly, due to the nature of reality television it is conceivable that viewers are able
to form a strong sense of affinity to cast members. Hence, there is a greater probability that
viewers of such shows will exhibit a greater inclination to emulate the lifestyle of the cast
members presented in such shows. An example of a reality television show is “Keeping
up with the Kardashians” which captures the extravagant lifestyle of the Kardashian
family. Since this is a internationally syndicated show, the consumption expenditures that
are depicted in the show are capable of affecting the consumption behavior of viewers
internationally even though the majority of the show is filmed in Los Angeles.
Therefore, advancements in advertisements, television and movies have allowed the
social dynamics of consumption to transcend the physical constraints that existed at the
time of Duesenberry’s (1949) and Veblen’s (1899) writing. In other words, it is now
possible for the demonstration effect and the emulation effect to occur without any direct
physical interactions between two individuals. Furthermore, this also indicates that digital
media has led to a standardization of consumption standards. Hence, in our contemporary
society, the phrase “keeping up with the Joneses” is an inaccurate description of the social
dynamics of consumption. Instead, a more appropriately colloquial phrase for capturing
the social influences that affect an individual’s consumption behavior would be “keeping
up with the Kardashians”.
The Internet
Similar to advertisements, television programs and movies, the advent of the internet
has also allowed for comparative consumption to be undertaken on the global scale. Two
major mechanisms through which the demonstration effect and the emulation effect occur
over the internet are: online reviews, and social media. In addition, advertising and digital
media (television programs and movies) has also become integrated with internet content
as well. The effects of online advertising and digital media on consumption decisions are
similar to the effects of their offline counterparts. Online advertising and digital media can
affect consumers through the demonstration effect and the emulation effect. On the other
hand, the narrative for how online reviews and social media affects consumer behaviors
is considerably different.
Apart from the specific mechanisms that were listed above the internet has also had a
general effect of granting consumers access to greater information on goods and services.
Before the widespread adoption of the internet the methods through which consumers
were able to compare prices for a particular good or service was limited to either visiting
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different merchants physically or calling each merchant individually. This process was
both time-consuming and laborious. However, the internet allows consumers to “cross
shop” between different merchants near instantaneously.
In addition to being able to compare the prices offered by different merchants for a
particular good, the internet also enables consumers to compare similar goods with far
greater ease as well. Whereas, before the internet, one would have had to physically
visit different stores in order to compare all the products available (since the majority of
stores would not have had every single product). Accordingly, with the emergence of
both professional and amateur reviews, it is probable that consumers are increasing their
use of the internet to compare different products that serve the same function. In that
sense, the internet has allowed for consumers to make far more educated consumption
decisions: a consumer is able to choose the best good given their budget through the
information obtained online. However, the ability to access information on a vast range of
products has another effect on consumption behavior as well. In particular, online reviews
are especially conducive in affecting an individual’s consumption behavior through the
demonstration effect.
Online reviews are readily accessible and plentiful since the internet essentially allows
for anyone to post their opinions on their experience with a certain product. Furthermore,
reviews generally use comparisons to create a frame of reference and assign ratings. Thus,
consumers can be exposed to frequent demonstrations of a goods superiority or inferiority
relative to similar goods. Each positive review reinforces the perception of a good’s
superiority while each negative review reinforces its perceived inferiority. It is highly
conceivable for one’s perception of a good to affect their consumption decisions. For
example, assume that an individual purchases computer A due to outstanding reviews,
but after a year a new computer (B) is introduced and the unanimous consensus among
reviewers is that it is far superior to computer A. Through repeated exposure to reviewers
demonstrating the inferiority ofA compared toB the consumer may become increasingly
dissatisfied with using computer A. As a result, the individual will wish to purchase
computer B even if they were initially completely satisfied with computer A and its
performance prior to the reviews. Hence the demonstration effect.
Conversely, the emulation effect closely relates to the influence of social media on
consumption decisions. Online social network are an extension of the local communities
depicted by Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949): they allow communities of
individuals to maintain personal relationships despite physical limitations. Therefore,
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the localization of the effect that status-seeking motives have on consumption decisions
no longer applies. Through the advent of social media individuals compare their
consumption with both others within their local community and those within their online
social networks. Hence, social media allows for indirect interpersonal comparative
consumption.
Given the standardization of consumption (standards) and the frame of reference for
comparative consumption, the nature of the social dynamics of consumption behavior
put forth by Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) evolve from being microeconomic
to macroeconomic. Hence, income inequality enters the behavioral analysis of
consumption as aggregate income inequality instead of local inequality. Furthermore,
the effect of widening income inequality also shifts from household consumption to
aggregate consumption. It follows that under a macroeconomic framework, widening
income inequality leads to an increase in both the the average MPC and aggregate
consumption expenditures of low- and middle-income households, given that top income
earners increase their visible consumption when their incomes increases and that low-
and middle-income households exhibit a relatively strong inclination to comparative
consumption. Therefore, one working assumption is that widening income inequality
will lead to an increase in aggregate personal consumption expenditures and a concurrent
fall in the aggregate personal savings rate.
3.5.2 The role of Wealth and Credit (Debt) in Consumption Decisions
Under the standard consumption theories an individual’s budget constraint is limited
by their income. While Duesneberry (1949) posits that an individual is able to
consume through dissaving, this feature is largely absent from contemporary behavioral
consumption theories. The act of dissaving is, by definition, the use of past savings
in financing consumption expenditures. The act of consumption financed through
dissaving is in essence wealth-financed consumption since accumulated savings enters an
individual’s balance sheet as their wealth. However, an individual’s wealth is comprised
of two different types of assets: liquid assets and illiquid assets. Since liquid assets are
assets that can be quickly converted into cash without losing their value liquid assets can
be used directly in the financing of consumption.34
34Examples of liquid assets can include the balance of an individual’s checking account, savings account and treasury
bills.
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On the other hand, illiquid assets cannot be used directly to finance consumption.
However, it is still possible to finance one’s consumption using funds derived from
their illiquid assets. For example, Barba and Pivetti (2009) found that the significant
rise in household debt was accumulated due to a growing tendency for low- and
middle-income households to extract equity from the value of their homes in order to
finance consumption. It follows that while an individual is able to use liquid assets either
directly or almost directly in the financing of consumption, generally illiquid assets can
only be used indirectly. Thus, we hypothesize that in addition to financing consumption
using one’s income it is also possible for households to undertake both wealth-financed
consumption and debt-financed consumption as well.
We believe that households primarily finance their consumption using their current
incomes. However, an individual will turn to dissaving when their desired consumption
expenditure exceeds their current income. However, if the individual’s desired consumption
expenditure exceeds their current income continuously over an certain period of time they
will deplete their stock of liquid assets. If one’s liquid assets are depleted and their desired
consumption expenditure still exceeds their current income than that individual will be
forced to finance their excess consumption through debt.
Figure 3.5.1: Composition of the Bottom 90% Wealth Share
Source:Saez and Zucman (2014)
Given the social effects of widening inequality on consumption, this theory indicates
that low- and middle-income households have experienced a decline in their liquid wealth
and increase in their indebtedness since the early 1980’s. This implication is in line with
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observed trends. In a study of the wealth distribution in the United States, Saez and
Zucman (2014) finds that widening income inequality has also coincided with widening
wealth inequality. However, the authors also find that the composition of the bottom 90%
wealth share has also changed significantly. Figure 3.5.1 indicates that illiquid assets have
become an increasingly large part of wealth for households in the bottom 90%. On the
other hand, the only category for liquid assets have shrunk significantly starting in the
late 1980s to the point where they are almost nonexistent by the late 1990s. Furthermore,
Barba and Pivetti (2009), Cynamon, Fazzari and Setterfield (2013), Cynamon and Fazzari
(2014), Kumhof, Rancie`re and Winant (2013), Palley (2010), and van Treek (2012),
among others have all identified the concurrent trends of widening income inequality
and rising household indebtedness specifically in low- and middle- income households.
3.6 A Revised Model of Behavioral Consumption
The observed trends in the consumption behavior of low- and middle-income
households since the early 1980s does not match the consumption behavior hypothesized
by traditional consumption theories: the majority of American households have continued
to increase their consumption expenditures despite either falling or stagnating real
incomes. Even though behavioral consumption theories, such as Duesenberry’s (1949)
relative income hypothesis, are more readily adept in explaining this paradoxical trend
they also face a number of theoretical limitations. The localization of both the
demonstration effect and the emulation effect fail to capture the influence mass media
has on consumer behavior. Additionally, the standard budget constraint employed by
existing consumption theories also fails to account for past savings and debt as a method
of financing one’s consumption. Accordingly, we will present theoretical models of
consumption that account for the “keeping up with the Kardashians” effect and the
inclusion of past savings and debt in the budget constraint on both the microeconomic
and macroeconomic level.
3.6.1 Microeconomic Model
Our microeconomic consumption model is a modified version of the equation Ci =
k(1 − a)Yi + aCi+1 from the “expenditure cascades” theory of consumption by Frank,
et al. (2014). This model implies that the consumption expenditure of household i
is strongly influenced by local consumption comparisons, and the magnitude of this
effect is governed by the parameter a. Additionally, an individual’s budget constraint
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is determined by their permanent income. The second half of the equation, which is
where the effects of local comparisons appears, is not restricted by any budget constraints
whatsoever.
Alternatively, we argue that the social dynamics of consumption behavior is not
restricted by physical proximity. Instead, in addition to direct interpersonal comparative
consumption the social dynamics of consumption should also include: indirect interpersonal
comparative consumption (social media), impersonal comparative consumption (mass
media) and indirect demonstration effect (advertising and online reviews). The additional
social influences can be represented in a vector of influences,
Γi,t =

C locj,t
Csocj,t
Cmmj,t
Φj,t
 (3.6.1)
where each influence has a weight captured in,
α =
(
a b c d
)
(3.6.2)
such that,
αΓi,t = aC
loc
j,t + bC
soc
j,t + cC
mm
j,t + dΦj,t (3.6.3)
where:
• Γi,t = the total exposure to social influences that household i has.
• α = parameter that captures the magnitude of the overall effect that social influences
have on the consumption behavior of household i.
• C locj,t = the consumption of others (j) that are in households i’s local community.
• Csocj,t = the consumption of others that are in households i’s social network.
• Cmmj,t = the consumption of others that household i is exposed to through mass media.
• Φj,t = household i’s exposure to superior goods through advertising and online
reviews.
• a, b, c and d are parameters that capture the magnitude of their respective variable’s
effect on household i’s consumption behavior.
The second notable modification that we will make is to the budget constraint. While
Frank, at el. (2014) only includes permanent income in their budget constraint, the
previous section argues that the budget constraint should also include past savings in
the form of liquid assets and the supply of consumer credit. The additional components
of the budget constraint are incorporated in the following manner,
Ψi,t = Yi + S
liquid
i + Credit
supply
i (3.6.4)
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where Ψi is household i’s budget constraint, Yi is household i’s current income, Si is
household iliquid’s stock of liquid assets and Creditsupplyi is the credit supply available to
household i. Additionally, the findings of Bertrand and Morse (2013) indicate that the
proposed relationship between an individual’s expectations for their future incomes plays
no role in determining their current consumption behavior.
Based on these modifications, the original equation of Ci = k(1 − a)Yi + aCi+1 by
Frank, et al. (2014) becomes,
Ci,t = k(1− α)Ψi,t + αΓi,t (3.6.5)
where k is a parameter that is unrelated to rank or the income.35 While it is not explicit
in equation 3.6.5, the value of an individual’s consumption expenditures that results from
social influences (αΓi,t) is assumed to be limited by k(1 − α)Γi. In other words, while
individuals are able to consume in excess of their current income through dissaving and
credit, their total consumption expenditures are unable to exceed the sum of their current
income, stock of existing liquid assets and the supply of credit that is available to them.
There are a number of significant differences between equations 3.6.5 and 3.4.4. First,
the theory of expenditure cascades (Frank, et al., 2014) assumes that the effect of
comparative consumption is restricted to one’s local community. Conversely, equation
3.6.5 allows for both indirect interpersonal comparisons and impersonal comparisons as
well. Furthermore, whereas the social effect in equation 3.4.4 is mostly based on the
emulation effect, equation 3.6.5 also allows for the possibility that social dynamics can
influence an individual’s consumption behavior through the demonstration effect.
Second, like equation 3.4.4, equation 3.6.5 also implies that widening inequality can
lower one’s savings rate. However, in addition to a lower savings rate, equation 3.6.5 also
implies that widening inequality can result in a reduction in an individual’s stock of liquid
assets (dissaving). Furthermore, equation 3.6.5 indicates that if an individual depletes
their stock of liquid assets, and their consumption expenditures still exceeds their current
income, then they can also finance their excess consumption using credit that is available
to them.
Yet financing consumption using debt is different from consuming out of savings and
income. In the following periods, debt servicing will effectively serve as an obligatory
non-consumption expenditure. Therefore, without an increase in either the individual’s
income or their stock of liquid assets, the individual will be forced to acquire additional
35Keynes’ (1936) exogenous spending and Duesenberry’s (1949) habitual spending effect are captured in parameter k.
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debt in order to maintain their consumption levels. It follows that equation 3.4.4 indicates
that financing consumption using credit can lead to a vicious cycle of debt accumulation.
Moreover, the rate at which an individual accumulates debt will be even greater if they
wish to not only maintain their consumption levels, but increase them as well.
However, if the share of consumption that is financed using debt is significant relative
to the share of consumption out of both current income and savings then the individual
in question will not be able to sustain their consumption patterns indefinitely. We hold
that the supply of credit available to households should exhibit a curve similar to a
logarithmic function. It follows that while the credit supply available to an individual
can expand rapidly during the initial periods the rate of growth will fall significantly
over time. Concurrently, the individual’s existing debt obligations and debt servicing
costs will effectively reduce the amount of their budget that is available for consumption
expenditures. Thus, with accelerating costs associated with their existing debt holdings,
and a decelerating growth of available credit there will be a point in time when the
individual will be forced to reduce their consumption expenditures unwillingly. At such
a point the only way for the individual to maintain their consumption levels would be
through increases in their current income or stock of liquid assets.
3.6.2 Macroeconomic Model
Expanding the microeconomic consumption function given by equation 3.6.5 to the
macroeconomic level can be achieved through the aggregation of the consumption
function Ci,t for all households within a given income group.36 For all households i
in income group p, the summation of all Ci,t becomes Cp,t,
Cp,t =
∑
Ci,t (3.6.6)
where p = income group p and i = 1, 2, ..., n, such that n is the nth household in income
group p. It follows that Cp,t is the (total) consumption expenditures made by households
in income group p. Expanding the variable Ci,t in equation 3.6.6 results in the following,
Cp,t =
∑
[ki(1− αi)Ψi,t + αiΓi,t] (3.6.7)
=
∑[
ki(1− αi)Ψi,t +
(
aiC
loc
j,t + biC
soc
j,t + ciC
mm
j,t + diΦj,t
)]
(3.6.8)
where j = 1, 2, ..., n such that n is the nth household in income group q. Given income
group p, income group q is defined such that group q is positioned higher on the income
36We distinguish between income groups, because of the social dynamics of consumption behavior (such as the
demonstration and emulation effects) that result in comparative consumption.
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distribution scale compared to p, p+q=1 and p 6= q. For example, p can denote the bottom
90% of the income distribution, and q the top 10% of the income distribution.
It is possible to reduce equation further. At the macroeconomic level the variables C locj,t ,
Csocj,t and C
mm
j,t can be aggregated into a single variable Cj,t. First, the physical limitation
that necessitated differentiation between direct physical comparative consumption and
indirect comparative consumption within the microeconomic household consumption
function is removed due to the nature of the macroeconomic aggregate consumption
function. In the aggregate, domestic physical restrictions are irrelevant. Similarly, there is
also no need for distinguishing between comparative consumption between interpersonal
comparative consumption (C locj,t andC
soc
j,t ) and impersonal comparative consumption (C
mm
j,t
). Assuming that the effects of advertising and online reviews are captured by parameter
k at the macroeconomic level, equation 3.6.2 is adjusted accordingly to,
Cp,t =
∑
[ki(1− αi)Ψi,t + (aiCj,t + diΦj,t)] (3.6.9)
=
∑
[ki(1− αi)Ψi,t + αiCj,t] (3.6.10)
The sum of multiple linear functions is not linear. However, for simplicity’s sake we
assume that Cp,t is a linear approximation of income group p’s consumption function.
Given this assumption, equation 3.6.10 can be expand to,
Cp,t = kp(1− αp)Ψp,t + αpACq,t (3.6.11)
As before, the first half of this consumption function (kp(1−αp)Ψp) represents non-social
consumption, or consumption that would have been undertaken without any social
influences. Likewise, αpCq,t represents the social, or comparative, consumption of
income group p. Lastly, it is implied that income group p’s consumption is limited by
their budget constraint.
Interpreting the Macroeconomic Model of Behavioral Consumption
Equation 3.6.11 indicates that income group p’s desired level of consumption (CDp,t) can
increase if any, or combination, of the following occurs:
1. There is an increase in the consumption of income group q (Cq,t)
2. There is an increase in the social consumption effect parameter (αp)
3. There is an increase in the non-rank and non-income parameter (kp)
While αp and kp are assumed to be exogenous, Cq,t is endogenous as it is determined
by the aggregate consumption function of income group q. Thus, one way Cq,t can
68 CHAPTER 3. CONSUMPTION THEORIES
increase is if there is an increase in the budget constraint of income group q. Specifically,
equation 3.6.11 implies that widening income inequality will cause households outside of
the top income groups (income group p) to experience an increase in their desired level
of consumption.
The increase in group p’s level of desired consumption is able to translate directly to an
increase in the level of their actual consumption up to the point where their desired level
of consumption is less than or equal to their current budget constraint such thatCp,t = CDp,t
iff CDp,t ≤ Ψp,t. However, it is not possible for the increase in income group p’s desired
level of consumption to be realized if it exceeds their current budget constraint. Thus,
Cp,t < C
D
p,t if C
D
p,t > Ψp,t. In this case, income group p’s consumption expenditures will
remain stagnant at Cp,t = Ψp,t until their budget constraint is expanded. In other words,
income group p can only consume more if there is an increase in either their disposable
income, savings or the credit supply available to them.
3.7 Working Hypothesis
There are two possible demand regimes under the standard Post-Kaleckian growth
model: wage-led and profit-led. Under a wage-led demand regime, an increase in the
labor share of national income will result in an increase in aggregate consumption, and a
decrease in aggregate investment; however, since the partial effect of the redistribution
of functional income towards wage income (labor share) is greater on aggregate
consumption is greater than that on investment the overall effect would be an increase
in aggregate demand. On the other hand, a decrease in the labor share will result in
a reduction in aggregate demand if an economy’s demand is wage-led. Conversely,
the opposite is true if demand is profit-led as the partial effect on investment would be
greater than that on consumption. Thus, an increase in the capital share of national
income would lead to an increase in aggregate demand while a decrease would reduce
it. Empirically speaking, Bowles and Boyer (1995), Hein and Vogal (2007) and Onaran,
Stockhammer, and Grafl (2011), among others, conclude that the United States has a
wage-led demand regime. However, there is a paradox: aggregate demand for the U.S.
has risen since the 1980s even though there has been a concurrent fall in the labor share.
This paradoxical relationship between rising aggregate demand and falling labor income
share within a wage-led demand regime cannot be explained within the confines of the
standard Post-Kaleckian model. Thus, amendments must be made to account for the
observed trends since the early 1980s.
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We theorize that there is a third demand regime in addition to the standard wage-led
and profit-led demand regimes: a debt-led demand regime. Whereas wages and profits
act as the obvious sources of income, debt accumulation acts an an external supplemental
source of funds. For example, debt allows for sustained investment growth in a profit-led
economy despite a falling capital share, because it is an external source of finance that is
available to firms. Firms are able to undertake investments using both retained profits and
debt. Our focus, however lies in the role of household debt, particularly consumer credit,
on consumption growth.
We use the flowchart presented in figure 5.0.1 as an illustration of our theoretical
narrative. Synthesizing the aforementioned theories on the sources of the declining
labor share, the augmented behavioral consumption theory and the implications of debt
on macroeconomic stability, we postulate that a systematic decline in the labor share
could result in one of four macroeconomic outcomes: unstable growth, sluggish growth,
stagnation or economic contraction.
The first of the flowchart represents the the sources of the declining labor share, while
the second stage represents the observed trends in both the personal and functional
distribution of income. In turn, the third stage depicts the augmented behavioral
consumption theory presented in sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.The simultaneous tilting of
factor shares towards capital and widening of income inequality has led to an increase
in the consumption of households whose income is most aligned with capital income
(profits). Since these individuals are also most likely the top income earners in the United
States their increased consumption has also led to an increase in the desired consumption
of low- and middle-income households as well.
Since the real incomes of low- and middle-income households have either stagnated or
fallen due to the decline in the labor share, the increase in the desired level of consumption
at the bottom can only be realized if it is financed using either dissaving or consumer credit
(stage four). Thus, the savings and debt decisions that are made here determines the final
outcome. Assuming that there is no government intervention:
1. Unstable Growth: If low- and middle-income households decide to either dissave
or consume out of debt then there will be an increase in the level of (bottom)
consumption. The increase in consumption will result in economic growth, however
due to the increase in household leveraging, growth will be unstable.
2. If low- and middle-income households decide to neither dissave, nor consume out
of debt then there will be no change in the level of (bottom) consumption.
a Sluggish Growth: Growth rate of top consumption is greater than the inflation rate.
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b Stagnation: If the growth rate of top consumption is equal to the inflation rate.
3. If low- and middle-income households decide to either increasing their savings,
or reduce the amount of debt they acquire then there will be a fall in the level of
(bottom) consumption.
a Sluggish Growth: If the decrease in bottom consumption is less than the increase in top
consumption, and the growth rate of top consumption is greater than the inflation rate.
b Stagnation: If the decrease in bottom consumption is less than the increase in top consumption,
but the growth rate of top consumption is equal to the inflation rate.
c Economic Contraction: If the decrease in bottom consumption is greater than the increase in
top consumption.
Accordingly, given that real incomes for low- and middle-income households have
either stagnated or fallen since the 1980s, the household budget constraint Ψi37 could
not have shifted without an external source of finance. Hence, the acquisition of debt was
necessary to increase their consumption. It follows that under this scenario consumption
growth in the United States became heavily dependent on both the availability and the
use of private household debt. Thus, we hypothesize that while it is possible that the U.S.
economy is wage-led in nature, demand growth has become increasingly debt-led during
the most recent periods of expansion.
We test this hypothesis using two different approaches. The first is a modified version of
the traditional structural Vector Autoregression (VAR) model approach that has been used
in past Post-Kaleckian growth model studies. The second approach involves constructing
two separate models. The first model within the second approach aims to identify the
relationships between the components of aggregate demand. The second models the
component of aggregate demand that “leads” aggregate demand38 in order to identify
underlying relationships. The standard VAR model is the more direct approach of the
two as fewer inferences are needed in identifying the relationship between the functional
distribution of income and economic growth. However, the indirect two-step approach
could arguably offer greater insights into the exact economic relationships between
functional income distribution and growth.
37Ψi = Yi + S
liquid
i + Credit
supply
i . The budget constraint is equal to the sum of current income, liquid assets and
the supply of credit.
38This is to say the component of aggregate demand that has the largest effect on the other components
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4. An Indirect Two-Step Approach
An alternative approach that is, to our knowledge, unique to this study would be
to first identify the nature of economic growth within the components of aggregate
demand. We need to identify whether aggregate demand is consumption-led or
investment-led.39 While it is also possible for aggregate demand to be either export-led
or government-led, we theorize that aggregate demand in the United States is most likely
either consumption-led or investment-led.
After determining whether aggregate demand in the United States is consumption–led
or investment-led the second step in this approach is to determine the respective
mechanisms. For example, if aggregate demand is consumption-led then we would
follow by constructing a model for the aggregate consumption function that incorporates
both income distribution and consumer debt. Conversely, if aggregate demand is
investment-led then the first model would be followed by a model for the investment
function.
4.1 Consumption-led or Investment-led
A standard stationary VAR model is used to identify whether aggregate demand in the
United States is consumption-led or investment-led.40 The variables used in the model are
the components of aggregate demand: aggregate consumption expenditures, investment,
government spending, exports and imports.41 Quarterly data for these variables is
available in real terms for the period of 1947q1 to 2014q 4 from the BEA’s National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) table 1.1.6.
With the exception of the variable “residuals”, all other variables used in this model are
in differences of logarithms form (∆log). This is done to avoid spurious regressions as it
is well-known that the components of aggregate demand are non-stationary I(1) variables
(see Granger and Newbold, 1973). Thus log-differentiating the data, which is tantamount
to specifying a model in growth rates, leads to the correct OLS inference. Furthermore,
despite the availability of data for the period 1947q1 to 2014q4, we choose to trim our
39The term “growth regime” had been previously used in the context of the functional distribution of income, whereas
here it is used in the context of the components of aggregate demand. In order to avoid confusion the latter term will
be forgone in favor of either consumption-led or investment-led aggregate demand.
40Giovannoni (2014c) presents the same argument in a cointegrated, non-stationary VAR model.
41Due to discrepancies in the reporting of the data (chained dollars), a final variable, “residuals”, is also included.
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sample period to 1954Q1-2007Q4 to avoid the effects of World War II, the Korean War,
the Treasury-Fed Accord, the Marshell Plan and etc,42 as well as the immediate and
lingering effects of the 2008 recession.
Our VAR model takes the form of,
Yt = A0 + A1Yt−1 + ...+ AnYt−n + t (4.1.1)
which, when written explicitly, is,
(4.1.2)

∆log (Ct)
∆log (It)
∆log (Gt)
∆log (Xt)
∆log (IMt)
 = β0 +

a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 a1,4 a1,5 a1,6
b1,1 b1,2 b1,3 b1,4 b1,5 b1,6
c1,1 c1,2 c1,3 c1,4 c1,5 c1,6
d1,1 d1,2 d1,3 d1,4 d1,5 d1,6
e1,1 e1,2 e1,3 e1,4 e1,5 e1,6


∆log (Ct−1)
∆log (It−1)
∆log (Gt−1)
∆log (Xt−1)
∆log (IMt−1)

+ ...+

an,1 an,2 an,3 an,4 an,5 an,6
bn,1 bn,2 bn,3 bn,4 bn,5 bn,6
cn,1 cn,2 cn,3 cn,4 cn,5 cn,6
dn,1 dn,2 dn,3 dn,4 dn,5 dn,6
en,1 en,2 en,3 en,4 en,5 en,6


∆log (Ct−n)
∆log (It−n)
∆log (Gt−n)
∆log (Xt−n)
∆log (IMt−n)
+t
where:
• β0 = a vector of constants• C = aggregate consumption
• I = total investment
• G = government spending
• X = exports
• IM = imports
• Resid = residual.
•  = the vector of residuals
Information criteria are used to set the lag length n. It may seem intuitive to interpret the
estimation results for a model where there are n number of lags to indicate that aggregate
demand is consumption-led if the sum of all the statistically significant coefficients
b1,1...bn,1 is greater than the sum of all the statistically significant coefficients a1,2...an,2.
However, interpreting the estimation results in this manner may be erroneous as it is
a static analysis that does not take into account the dynamics of the model, i.e the
cross-relationships between the variables.
If this model is dynamic and indeed accounts for the interrelationships between the
variables, then the correct method of qualifying the impact of shocks in one variable on
the others is through an impulse-response analysis.43 It follows that aggregate demand is
consumption-led if the magnitude of the effect of a shock in consumption on investment
is greater than that of investment on consumption. On the other hand, aggregate demand
42see King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991).
43The idea behind impulse-response functions (IEFs) is to trace out the (accumulated) effect of a one-standard deviation
shock to one variable on another variable, ceteris peribus. In essence IRFs are dynamic (accumulated) partial
derivatives.
74 CHAPTER 4. AN INDIRECT TWO-STEP APPROACH
is investment-led if the effect of a shock in investment on consumption is greater than that
of consumption on investment.
Hence, determining whether aggregate demand is consumption-led or investment-led
within a dynamic VAR model will require an impulse-response analysis. To confirm the
correct method of interpretation a Granger causality test will be conducted to identify
whether the variables are exogenous or endogenous. Thus, presuming that the model is
indeed dynamic, our procedure has two steps. The first step is to estimate the likelihood
of variable A “causing” variable B using the Granger causality test. The second step is to
qualify the magnitude of the impact of variable A on variable B using IRFs.
4.1.1 Results
The VAR model that is given by equation 4.1.2 is estimated over 1954Q1 to 2007Q4.
Information criteria, given by table A.1.1 in appendix A, indicate that the appropriate
lag length is one. Before we begin to interpret the results it is necessary to first conduct
a Granger causality test as to determine the appropriate method of interpretation. The
results of the VAR Granger causality/block exogeneity Wald tests (table 4.1.1) indicate
that there are no exogenous variables within the estimated VAR model for the sample
of 1954Q1-2007Q4. Additionally, we are unable to determine an exclusive direction
of Granger causality between consumption and investment, which indicates that there
is bi-directional causality between consumption and investment.44 Thus, the Granger
causality test indicates that the model is dynamic and the correct method of interpretation
is through an impulse-response analysis, and not through comparing the coefficients of
the estimation results.
Table 4.1.1: 1954Q1-2007Q4 Granger Causality/ Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
For complete results see table A.1.2 in appendix A
The results for the impulse response test (figure 4.1.1) show that the magnitude of
investment’s response to a shock to consumption is noticeably greater than that of
44However, the complete results of the Granger causality test (table A.1.2 in appendix A) show that the degree of
causality is stronger for consumption on investment than that of investment on consumption.
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Figure 4.1.1: 1954Q1-2007Q4 Impulse Response
Accumulated response to generalized one s.d. innovations± 2 s.e. For complete results see figure A.1.1
consumption’s response to investment. Furthermore, whereas the effect of investment
on consumption becomes statistically insignificant around the fifth quarter, the effect of
consumption on investment remains statistically significant through twenty periods (5
years). We interpret the results of the impulse response test to indicate that aggregate
demand in the U.S. is consumption-led over the entire sample of 1954Q1-2007Q4.
4.1.2 Robustness
We investigate the robustness of our results by breaking down the sample into
subsamples, and repeat our analysis using the Granger causality test and IRFs for
each subsample. The subsamples, which are chosen on economic grounds, are:
1954Q1-1979Q4, 1980Q1-2007Q4 and 1990Q1-2007Q4. The subsamples of 1954Q1-1979Q4
and 1980Q1-2007Q4 are chosen the reflect the trends in both the functional and personal
distribution of income.45
The information criteria given by table A.1.4 (appendix A) indicate that the appropriate
lag length for the 1954Q1-1979Q4 subsample is one. Additionally, the Granger causality
tests for this subsample (table A.1.5) indicates that, with the exception of the government
spending variable, the variables are again endogenous between 1954Q1 and 1979Q4.46 It
follows that the VAR model for this subsample is dynamic, hence the appropriate method
of interpretation is through an impulse-response analysis.
The results of the impulse-response analysis for the subsample of 1954Q1-1979Q4,
given by figure 4.1.2 and A.1.2. Figure 4.1.2 indicates that aggregate demand is
45The concurrent processes of a declining labor share and widening income inequality began between the late 1970s
and the early 1980s.
46This indicates that G is an (exogenous) driving force behind aggregate demand.
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consumption-led during this subsample: the magnitude of investment’s response to
a shock to consumption is noticeably greater than that of consumption’s response to
investment. Similar to the results for the entire sample, the response of consumption
to a shock in investment becomes statistically insignificant after five periods while the
response of investment to a shock in consumption remain statistically significant up until
the seventeenth quarter after the simulated shock.
Table A.1.7 in appendix A indicates that the appropriate lag length for the 1980Q1-2007Q4
subsample is one. As before, the results of the Granger causality test given by table
A.1.8 indicate that the model is dynamic for the 1980Q1-2007Q4 subsample (with the
exception of exports the variables are endogenous). Therefore, the appropriate method of
interpretation for this subsample is through an impulse-response analysis.
The results of the impulse-response analysis in figure 4.1.3 also indicates that aggregate
demand was consumption-led for the 1980Q1-2007Q4 subsample. While initially
statistically insignificant the response of investment to a shock in consumption becomes
statistically significant and positive after period two and remains so up to period twenty.
On the other hand the response of consumption to a shock in investment is statistically
insignificant throughout, and the magnitude of consumption’s response is therefore
interpreted as zero.
Additionally, figure A.1.3 indicates that the only statistically significant impulse-response
relationships (and therefore the only relationships with a non-zero magnitude) for the
1980Q1-2007Q4 subsamplle other than the investment to consumption relationship and
relationships between the same variable (i.e. the response of consumption to a shock in
consumption) are: the response of consumption to imports, the response of investment
to imports, the response of imports to consumption and the response of imports to
investments. However, the results in figure A.1.3 indicate that aggregate demand is
not import-led as the magnitude of import-consumption is greater than the magnitudes
of consumption-investment, imports-investment and investments-imports. Hence, figure
A.1.3 confirms the interpretation of figure 4.1.3 that aggregate demand is consumption-led
during the 1980Q1-2007Q4. Furthermore, due to the statistical insignificance of the
consumption-investment relationship (magnitude of zero) figures 4.1.3 and A.1.3 also
indicate that the consumption-led nature of aggregate demand is even greater in the
1980Q1-2007Q4 subsample than that of the 1954Q1-1979Q4 subsample.
The final subsample we consider is 1990Q1 to 2007Q4. This subsample was chosen
to see if the increase in the consumption-led nature of aggregate demand between
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the subsamples of 1954Q1-1979Q4 and 1980Q1-2007Q4 continued within the latter
subsample. As before, table A.1.10 in appendix A indicates that the appropriate lag length
for the 1990Q1-2007Q4 subsample is again one. Similarly, the results of the Granger
causality test (table A.1.11) indicate that the model is dynamic for the 1990Q1-2007Q4
subsample as well since all variables are endogenous. Thus, the appropriate method of
interpretation for this subsample is once again through an impulse-response analysis.
The results of the impulse-response analysis in figure 4.1.4 indicates that aggregate
demand continued to be consumption-led over the 1990Q1-2007Q4 subsample. Similar
to the results of the impulse-response analysis for the 1980Q1-2007Q4 subsample, the
response of investment to a shock in consumption is initially statistically insignificant,
but becomes statistically significant and positive after period two and remains so up to
period twenty. The response of consumption to a shock in investment is again statistically
insignificant throughout. It follows that aggregate demand between 1990Q1 and 2007Q4
is more consumption-led compared to aggregate demand between 1954Q1 and 1979Q4.
Given the results of estimating the VAR model using the three different subsamples we
are able to conclude that the results for the entire sample are robust. Between 1954Q1
and 2007Q4 aggregate demand in the United States is consumption-led. Furthermore, our
robustness tests also indicate that aggregate demand became even more consumption-led
after 1980Q1. In other words, the period where consumption played an greater role in
aggregate demand growth was also the period in which the labor share was declining
and income inequality was widening. Hence, it follows that since aggregate demand is
consumption-led the second step in our two-step approach will be constructing a model
for the aggregate consumption function.
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Figure 4.1.2: 1954Q1-1979Q4 Impulse Response
Accumulated response to generalized one s.d. innovations± 2 s.e. For complete results see figure A.1.2 in appendix A
Figure 4.1.3: 1980Q1- 2007Q4 Impulse Response
Accumulated response to generalized one s.d. innovations± 2 s.e. For complete results see figure A.1.3 in appendix A
Figure 4.1.4: 1990Q1- 2007Q4 Impulse Response
Accumulated response to generalized one s.d. innovations± 2 s.e. For complete results see figure A.1.4 in appendix A
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4.2 Behavioral Aggregate Consumption Function
We construct an original aggregate consumption function which not only disaggregates
consumption by income groups, but also incorporates consumer debt. The theoretical
basis of this augmented consumption function is derived from the behavioral consumption
function presented in the previous chapter (equation 3.6.11).
The derivation of the model follows from the standard Keynesian aggregate consumption
function,
ACt = β0 + β1Y
D
t + µt (4.2.1)
where:
• ACt is aggregate personal consumption expenditures in period t
• Y Dt is total (current) disposable income in period t
• µt is the error term
• β0 is a constant capturing autonomous consumption
• β1 is the marginal propensity to consume.
Incorporating the social dynamics of consumption into equation 4.2.1 requires
disaggregating both total disposable income and total personal consumption expenditures
into different groups along the personal income distribution scale. The methods used
to disaggregate the variables are covered in subsection 4.2.1. Given the disaggregated
variables, it follows that,
ACt = Cp,t + Cq,t = β0 + β1Y
D
p,t + β2Y
D
q,t + µt (4.2.2)
Cp,t = β0 + β1Y
D
p,t + β2Y
D
q,t + β3Cq,t + µt (4.2.3)
where p = income group p and q = income group q such that p 6= q. Similar to the notation
in equation 3.6.11, income groups p and q are define so that income group q holds a higher
position on the income distribution scale than group p, and that i+ j = 1. For example, if
i denotes the bottom 90% of the income distribution, then j would denote the top 10% of
the distribution. Similarly, if i denotes the bottom 99% of the income distribution, then j
would denote the top 1% of the distribution.
The next step in the derivation of the behavioral aggregate consumption model is the
introduction of the modified budget constraint. Starting from the standard Keynesian
consumption function given by equation 4.2.1 the standard budget constraint variable
(Y D) is expanded to include savings and debt. The resulting consumption function takes
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the form,
Ct = β0 + β1(Y
D
t + St + Credit
S
t ) + µt (4.2.4)
Ct = β0 + β1Y
D
t + β1St + β1Credit
S
t + µt (4.2.5)
where St is the level of past savings (liquid assets) and CreditSt is the credit supply.
Combining equations 4.2.3 and 4.2.5 we get,
(4.2.6)Cp,t = β0 + β1Y
D
p,t + β2Sp,t + β3Credit
S
p,t + β4Y
D
q,t
+ β5Sq,t + β6Credit
S
q,t + β7Cq,t + µt
From an Ideal Model to a Tractable, Estimable Model
The following variables are omitted from equation 4.2.6,
• Sp,t and Sq,t are omitted, because of the method through which we construct Cp,t
and Cq,t. Since the average propensity of groups p and q are derived directly from
their respective savings rate, including both the savings variable and consumption
variable would result in a singular matrix (see subsection 4.2.1).
• Y Dq,t is omitted on the basis that top consumption Cq,t already contains that
information. In other words, we assume that Cq,t = aY Dq,t + b
• The equation Cq,t = aY Dq,t + b also assumes that consumer credit extended to top
incomes is negligible (or at least that ∆CreditSq,t is constant). To our knowledge,
data for the borrowing patterns of top income earners is not available at the
macroeconomic level.
Given the omitted variables equation 4.2.6 becomes,
Cp,t = β0 + β1Y
D
p,t + β2Credit
S
p,t + β3Cq,t + µt (4.2.7)
In other words, the consumption of income group p is a function of their current
disposable income, the supply of credit available to them and the consumption of income
group q. The coefficient β1 measures group p’s marginal propensity to consume out
of disposable income, while β2 measures their marginal propensity to consume out of
borrowing.47 Lastly, the coefficient β3 measures the magnitude of the effects of social
47Since we had to assume that all credit is held by the bottom income group p, β2 is not necessarily unity.
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influence on the aggregate consumption behavior of income group p.48 In essence, the β3
in equation 4.2.7 represents the α in equation 3.6.11.
There are a few final adjustments and assumptions that need to be made to equation
4.2.7 before being able to run a regression. All the variables in equation 4.2.7 are given
in levels. However, due to the strong autocorrelation that is exhibited in each variable,
the variables must be converted from levels into differences of logarithms form (∆log).
Secondly, we must make the assumption that the supply of credit is fully utilized such
that the growth rate of the credit supply is equal to the growth rate of credit outstanding.
Finally, it is not possible to disaggregate total credit outstanding data according to income
groups on the macroeconomic level. Thus, it is also necessary to assume that Creditt
is an appropriate proxy for CreditSp,t. However, it is possible to disaggregate total credit
outstanding between non-revolving credit and revolving credit.49 With these adjustments
and assumptions, equation 4.2.7 becomes,
∆log(Cp,t) = β0 + β1∆log(Y
D
p,t) + β2∆log(Creditt) + β3∆log(Cq,t) + µt (4.2.8)
(4.2.9)∆log(Cp,t) = β0 + β1∆log(Y
D
p,t) + β2∆log(Credit
R
t )
+ β3∆log(Credit
NR
t ) + β4∆log(Cq,t) + µt
where CreditRt = revolving credit and Credit
NR
t = non-revolving credit. We will use
the Bai-Perron breakpoint regression method to estimate equation 4.2.9. Based on
the OLS regression method, the Bai-Perron breakpoint regression is a set of multiple
linear regressions that accounts for structural breaks in the data.50 In line with standard
practice, we will use White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and Covariances.
Furthermore, we will also allow for heterogeneous error distributions across breaks.
4.2.1 Data
Data for aggregate consumption and total disposable income are retrieved from the
BEA’s NIPA tables. Data for income shares with capital gains (ISwCG) are from the
World Top Income Database (WTID) while data for the disaggregated savings rates are
from Saez and Zucman (2014). Finally, data for total, revolving and non-revolving credit
outstanding are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED).
48Stated differently, β3 measures the magnitude of income group p’s comparative consumption.
49An example of revolving credit is a credit card, while examples of non-revolving credit are auto loans and student
loans.
50See Bai and Perron (2003)
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Converting Annual Data into Quarterly Data
Aggregate consumption and total disposable income are the only variables that are
available on a quarterly basis. Data for total, revolving and non-revolving credit
outstanding are available on either a monthly or annual basis. We decide to retrieve the
monthly data, and “quaterize” it by using an average aggregation method. On the other
hand, data for the income share and disaggregated savings rates are only available on an
annual basis.
Two separate “quaterization” methods can be used to convert the frequency of the
annual data into quarters: the constant-match average method and the quadratic-match
average method. The constant-match average method assumes that the quarterly values
for a given year are equal to their respective annual value. On the other hand, the
quadratic-match average method assumes that there is a quadratic pattern underlying the
annual data and conducts a local quadratic interpolation of the annual data to fill the
quarterly data.
Disaggregating Total Disposible Income
The following equation is used to disaggregate the total disposable income according
to the income distribution:
Y Dp = Y
D × Yp
Y
(4.2.10)
Where:
• Y Dp = income group p’s disposable income
• Y D = total disposable income (NIPA)
• Yp/Y = group p’s share of income including capital gains (WTID)
The WTID’s income share including capital gains (ISwCG) measure is used to measure
the pre-tax income share of a given income group. Therefore, it is necessary to assume
that the distribution of pre-tax income including capital gains (ISwCG) is an accurate
approximation of the distribution of disposable income. Additionally, the WTID’s ISwCG
is only available as annual data, and was therefore converted into quarterly data using both
“quaterization” methods. Given the above assumptions, equation 4.2.10 becomes,
Y Dp = Y
D × Y
D
p
Y D
(4.2.11)
where Y Dp /Y D = Yp/Y is group p’s share of disposable income.
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Disaggregating Consumption by Income Groups
The following equation is used to construct a measure for aggregate consumption that
is disaggregated by groups along the income distribution scale:
Cp =
[
Y Dp (1− SRp′)
]
= Y Dp × CPp′ (4.2.12)
Where:
• Cp = income distribution group p’s consumption expenditures
• Y Dp = income distribution group p’s disposable income as calculated by equation 4.2.10
• SRp′ = wealth distribution group p′’s savings rate (Saez and Zucman, 2014)
• CPp′= wealth distribution group p′’s propensity to consume
The savings rate that is calculated by Saez and Zucman (2014) is for groups along the
wealth distribution scale and not the income distribution. Thus it is necessary to assume
that the wealth distribution is an accurate approximate for the income distribution such
that if household i is a member of income group p they are also members of wealth group
p′. It is relatively safe to assume that households in the bottom 90% and top 1% of the
wealth distribution are also in the bottom 90% and top 1% of the income distribution,
respectively. However, this may not necessarily be the case for the top 10-5% and the top
5-1%. One solution to this issue is to aggregate the top 10-5% and the top 5-1% together
into the top 10-1%, or to even aggregate the groups into the top 10%. Additionally,
another alternative is to aggregate the groups into the bottom 95% and the top 5%. Given
these assumptions, equation 4.2.12 becomes:
Cp =
[
Y Dp (1− SRp)
]
= Y Dp × CPp (4.2.13)
Where:
• SRp = SRp′ = income distribution group p’s savings rate
• CPp= CPp′ = income distribution group p’s propensity to consume
4.2.2 Results
We begin by estimating the standard Keynesian aggregate consumption function
(equation 4.2.1) using the Bai-Perron (1998) breakpoint regression method. The variables
for aggregate consumption (Ctotal) and total disposable income (Y Dtotal) are placed in
differences of logarithms form due to the presence of autocorrelation in levels.
Bali and Perron (1998) present a battery of structural break tests to choose from, and all
tests conclude that there are no breaks in in the coefficients between 1954Q1 and 2007Q4,
thus the model is stable. The reported Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there is no
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residual autocorrelation. Since β1 is the short term elasticity of aggregate consumption to
the short term elasticity of total disposable income (εC/Y D)51 it follows that,
εC/Y D =
∆C/C
∆Y D/Y D
=
∆C
C
× Y
D
∆Y D
(4.2.14)
=
∆C
∆Y D
× Y
D
C
(4.2.15)
where ∆C
∆Y D
is the marginal propensity to consume, and Y
D
C
is the inverse of the average
propensity to consume. It follows from equation 4.2.15 that the MPC can be defined as:
MPC =
∆C
∆Y D
= εC/Y D ×
C
Y D
= β1 × APC (4.2.16)
Thus, it follows from the estimation results in table 4.2.1 that we are able to estimate the
marginal propensity to consume in the United States between 1954Q1 and 2007Q4 under
the standard aggregate demand function using the equation:
MPCt = 0.948769× APCt (4.2.17)
Equation 4.2.17 indicates that during the period of 1954Q1 to 2007Q4 the aggregate
marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income is approximately 94.87% of
the average propensity to consume out of disposable income.
Standard Aggregate Consumption Function
Table 4.2.1: Estimation Results Figure 4.2.1: Residuals
Even though both the overall fit and the standard errors of regression for this model are
acceptable, figure 4.2.1 shows that sizable spikes in the residuals occur with increasing
51While the differences of logarithmic form is interpreted as change in elasticities the summation of the differences in
elasticities is equal to elasticities such that:∑[
∆log(Ctotal) = β0 + β1∆log(Y
D
total) + 
]→ log(Ctotal) = β0 + β1log(Y Dtotal) +∑ 
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frequency over the sample period. This suggests that even though aggregate consumption
is strongly correlated with total disposable income, the latter periods are marked by the
emergence of other non-income variables that affect aggregate consumption. Therefore,
we introduce the adjustments to the standard aggregate consumption function that were
outlined by equations 4.2.2 to 4.2.9. We continue to use the Bai-Perron breakpoint
regression method, and employ the “Sequential tests all subsets” structural break test.
Many models and specifications were tested, however only the results of the final
specification are reported below.
The Specification Process
The first adjustment follows from equation 4.2.3. Aggregate consumption is disaggregated
by income groups between the bottom 90% (income group p) and the top 10% (income
group q). With this adjustment the dependent variable being estimated is the consumption
of the bottom 90%, the disposable income of the bottom 90% is the independent variable
and the consumption of the top 10% is the control variable.52 Additional income group
combinations that were tested include: bottom 95%/top 5%, bottom 99%/top 1% and
bottom 90%/top 10-1%/top 1%.53 The reason behind selecting these specific income
groups is due to specifics in the construction of the dataset (see subsection 4.2.1). The
values for both R-squared and adjusted R-squared improve while the standard errors
of regression decrease as a result for all income group combinations, which therefore
justifies adjusting the standard aggregate consumption function for different income
groups.
The second adjustment follows from equations 4.2.6 and 4.2.7. Control variables for
consumer credit are added to the regression model. The first version of this adjustment is
controlling for total credit(equation 4.2.8), whereas the second disaggregates total credit
into non-revolving credit and revolving credit (equation 4.2.9). Similar to the case of the
first adjustment, the values for both R-squared and adjusted R-squared improve while
the standard errors of regression decrease as a result for both versions of the second
adjustment. While we decide to use the latter version of this adjustment, the first version
of this adjustment will be used as a robustness test. One notable limitation of controlling
for non-revolving credit and revolving credit is that the data for revolving credit does not
exist before 1968Q1. Conversely, data for total credit exists for the entire sample period.
52We do not control for the disposable income of the top 10% since controlling for both the disposable income and
consumption of the top 10% would lead to issues with multicollinearity.
53Such that the dependent variable is the consumption of the first income group listed in each combinations.
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As a result of this data limitation, the first possible observation for revolving credit when
in differences of logarithms form is 1968Q2.
The Final Specification
The final specification of the model disaggregates total consumption between the
bottom 90%, top 10-1% and the top 1%, and can be represented by the following equation,
(4.2.18)∆log(C90,t) = β0 + β1∆log(Y
D
90,t) + β2∆log(C101,t) + β3∆log(C1,t)
+ β4∆log(Credit
R
t ) + β5∆log(Credit
NR
t ) + µtwhere:
• C90,t= consumption of the bottom 90%
• Y D90,t= disposable income of the bottom 90%
• C101,t= consumption of the top 10-1%
• C1,t= consumption of the top 1%
• CreditRt = revolving credit outstanding
• CreditNRt = non-revolving credit outstanding
As before, the Bai-Perron breakpoint regression method is used to estimate equation
4.2.24. We considered all possible Bai-Perron structural break tests and employ
the “Sequential tests all subsets” test54 since it leads to the most economically
significant break dates. We also have a large sample size of 159 observations. White
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances, allowing for heterogeneous
error distributions across breaks and the break selection specifications used are standard
economic practices.
The estimation results (table 4.2.2) finds that there are four significant structural breaks
for the sample of 1968Q2 to 2007Q4. The R-squared and adjusted R-squared values
indicate that the overall fit of the model is excellent, and the standard errors of regression
are very small. Additionally, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that autocorrelation in
the residuals is not present within our regression. 55
Overall, the estimation results indicate that the relationship between the consumption of
the bottom 90% and their disposable income (β1) is statistically significant at the 99.99%
confidence level throughout the entire sample. We calculate that the average value of
β1 over the entire sample to be approximately 1.0715. Employing the same derivation
method (equations 4.2.14 to 4.2.16), we are able to estimate the bottom 90%’s marginal
propensity to consume out of disposable income using the equation:
MPCB90 = 1.0715× APCB90 (4.2.19)
54This structural break test method is also referred to as the “Bai test of breaks in all recursively determined partitions”.
55However, figure A.2.1 in appendix A does shows that there are a number of sizable spikes in the regression residuals
between the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. Whereas these spikes would be treated through the use of dummy variables
under a standard OLS regression, the Bai-Perron regression method prevents us from doing so as it would lead to a
near singular matrix in at least one of the subsamples.
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Equations 4.2.17 and 4.2.19 suggests that the aggregate MPC out of total disposable
income is lowered by the MPC of the top 10%. In other words, the MPC of the top
10% is lower than the MPC of the bottom 90%.
Another interesting observation emerges if we look at the values of the coefficient
for the bottom 90%’s disposable income (β1) over the four subsamples. The values
of β1 begin to fall starting after the second subsample. A general inference of this
trend is that the elasticity of the bottom 90%’s consumption with respect to their
disposable income decreases over the subsamples of 1987Q1-1994Q1, 1994Q2-2002Q1
and 2002Q1-2007Q4. Moreover, this trend is even stronger when we look at the values of
β1 when the coefficients are scaled such that the variance of all the independent variables
is equal to one. The motivation for standardizing the coefficients is so that we are able to
obtain the relative magnitudes of the regression coefficients.
Table A.2.1 in appendix A indicates that once standardized the decline in the value of
β1 starts following the first subsample, and becomes even more pronounced as well. The
values of the standardized regression coefficients are to be interpreted as the magnitude
of the corresponding independent variable’s effect relative to the magnitudes of the other
independent variables. Hence, the results shown in table A.2.1 indicates that over the four
subsamples there was a concurrent fall in the role of disposable income in consumption
decisions, and an increase in the role of non-income variables. Thus, it is necessary to
Table 4.2.2: Bottom 90% Consumption Function Estimation Results
88 CHAPTER 4. AN INDIRECT TWO-STEP APPROACH
examine the estimation result for the non-income variables (control variables) for each
subsample in greater depth.
For the first subsample of 1968Q2-1986Q4, the coefficients for revolving credit (β4)
is statistically insignificant, thus we take their values as zero. On the other hand the
coefficients β2 (the consumption of the top 10-1%), β3 (the consumption of the top 1%)
and β5 (non-revolving credit ) are statistically significant at the 93.87%, 99.99% and
88.94 confidence levels respectively. However, these coefficients are so small that we
ought to consider them zero. In a similar fashion, β5 is marginally significant and close
to zero. This implies that consumption is credit-inelastic. Thus, what mattered most for
consumption in the post war period was disposable income.
In the following 1987Q1-1994Q1 subsample, the coefficients β2 (the consumption of
the top 10-1%), β3 (the consumption of the top 1%) become statistically insignificant
while β4 (revolving credit) remains insignificant. β5 (non-revolving credit) remains
statistically significant at the 88.19% confidence interval), but its value becomes negative.
This result is not intuitive, but could possibly reflect the fact that non-revolving credit is
commonly used to buy “big ticket” items, and that consumers in the bottom 90% would
reduce their consumption expenditures after purchasing such items using non-revolving
credit as to remain solvent.
In the 1994Q2-2002Q1 subsample, credit remains insignificant (β4 = β5 = 0), while
both top consumption variables (β2 and β3) are statistically significant. The coefficient for
the consumption of the top 10-1% is positive, and is therefore in line with our comparative
consumption theory (the emulation and demonstration effects). However, interpreting
the coefficient for the consumption of the top 1% is not intuitive since it is negative.
Nevertheless, the estimation results for the third subsample will still indicate the presence
of comparative consumption since the combined effect is positive. In order to do this
we must look at the standardized coefficients given by table A.2.1 in appendix A. Since
the sum of the standardized coefficients is approximately 0.0487, it follows that between
1994Q2 and 2002Q1 the consumption of the bottom 90% increased when consumption
expenditures at the top increased. Furthermore, it stands to reason that since the credit
variables are insignificant, then increases in consumption resulting from social dynamics
were financed mostly by dissavings.56
In the final subsample (2002Q2-2007Q4), β3 (the consumption of the top 1%) and
β5 (non-revolving credit) are statistically insignificant. The value of the coefficient
56The real disposable income of the bottom 90% were either stagnanting or falling during this period.
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for the consumption of the top 10-1% (β2) increases from 0.131418 to 0.173778, and
is now statistically significant at the 99.95% confidence interval. More importantly,
revolving credit (β4) is statistically significant at the 99.92% confidence interval in the
final subsample. Employing a method of derivation similar to the one used in the
construction of equation 4.2.16, the bottom 90%’s marginal propensity to consume out
of revolving and non-revolving credit can be estimated using the following equations:
MPCcredit
R
90,t = εC/creditR ×
C
creditR
= β4 × APCcreditR90,t (4.2.20)
MPCcredit
NR
90,t = εC/creditNR ×
C
creditNR
= β5 × APCcreditNR90,t (4.2.21)
Plugging in the values for the first subsample (table 4.2.2) into equation 4.2.20 we get:
MPCcredit
R
90,t = .197944×APCcredit
R
90,t (4.2.22)
Equation 4.2.22 indicates that from 2002 to 2007Q4 the consumption of the bottom 90%
exhibited a positive relationship with outstanding revolving credit.
Furthermore table A.2.1 in appendix A shows that the magnitude of the standardized
regression coefficient for revolving credit (.197944) is more than half of that for
disposable income (.350012). These results indicate that the social influences on
consumption of the bottom 90% increased noticeably between the last two subsamples57,
and that increases in consumption resulting from social dynamics between 2002Q2 and
2007Q4 were financed increasingly through debt. We interpret this to mean that the
bottom 90% consumed more when the credit supply increased, an interpretation that
is in line with our behavioral consumption function (specifically the modified budget
constraint).
Robustness
To assess the robustness of our results we conducted two additional estimations using
different modifications of equation 4.2.24. The same structural break test method and
break selection criteria that were used in the above estimation are used in the robustness
tests as well. The first test entails replacing the revolving and non-revolving credit
outstanding variables with total credit outstanding. The regression equation for these
tests is,
(4.2.23)∆log(C90,t) = β0 + β1∆log(Y
D
90,t) + β2∆log(C101,t)
+ β3∆log(C1,t) + β4∆log(Credit
T
t ) + µt
57We take β3 as zero since it is statistically insignificant. Therefore based on the standardized coefficients the magnitude
of the overall social effect in the final subsample is 0.134099 compared to 0.0487 in the prior subsample.
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where CreditTt is total credit outstanding. Even though data for total credit outstanding
is available from 1954Q1, we choose to restrict the sample to the period of 1968Q2 to
2007Q4 in order to remain consistent with the sample used in our original estimation.
The results of the first robustness test are presented in table A.2.2 in appendix A. The
overall fit of this model improves slightly as there is a small improvement in both the
adjusted R-squared and standard errors of the regression. The structural break test finds
that between 1968Q1 to 2007Q4 there are three breaks in the data. Additionally two of
the break dates 1987Q1 and 2002Q2 remain unchanged, but the third break date changes
from 1994Q2 to 1993Q2.
With the exception of the credit variable becoming statistically significant in the first
and second subsample, the statistical significance of the variables remains unchanged
(there are only slight variations in the degree of significance). Similarly the general
implications of our original model also remains unchanged when revolving and non-revolving
credit is aggregated into total credit. Table A.2.3 indicates that the relative magnitude
(standardized regression coefficients) of the bottom 90%’s disposable income in determining
their consumption decisions still declines throughout the entire sample, and that there is
a concurrent increase in the relative magnitude of the control variables.
The second estimation used in our robustness analysis modifies the original estimation
specification by introducing a control for the consumer price index (CPI). The reason for
adding the CPI as a control variable follows from Bertrand and Morse’s (2013) finding
that there is a positive relationship between the CPI and top income levels. Therefore
it could be the case that the positive relationship between top consumption and the
consumption of the 90% is actually due to a positive relationship between the CPI and
bottom 90% consumption. Thus, it follows that the rise in debt financed consumption
could have resulted from higher prices of the goods that were already being consumed
rather than increases in comparative consumption. The regression equation for the second
robustness test is,
(4.2.24)
∆log(C90,t) = β0 + β1∆log(Y
D
90,t) + β2∆log(C101,t)
+ β3∆log(C1,t) + β4∆log(Credit
R
t )
+ β5∆log(Credit
NR
t ) + β6∆log(CPIt) + µt
where CPIt is the consumer price index in period t.
The estimation results for the second robustness test, which are presented in table A.2.4
in appendix A, indicate that controlling for the CPI results in a notable improvement in
the fit of the model. Both the R-squared and adjusted R-squared increase over that of the
original specification. Furthermore, the standard errors of the regression also decrease.
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The structural break test finds that all three break dates when controlling for the CPI are
identical to those found without controlling for the CPI.
The coefficient for the CPI (β6) is negative throughout the entire sample, but
is only statistically significant in the last two subsamples of 1994Q2-2002Q1 and
2002Q2-2007Q4 at the 93.14% and 99.93% confidence intervals respectively. We
construct the following equation in order to interpret β6 in terms of changes in the
consumption of the bottom 90% and changes in the CPI:
∆C90,t = ∆CPIt
(
εC/CPI × Ct
CPIt
)
= ∆CPIt
(
β6,t × Ct
CPIt
)
(4.2.25)
Plugging in the values of β6 into equation 4.2.25 indicates that increases in the CPI
led to decreases in the consumption of the bottom 90% during the last two subsamples.
Furthermore tables A.2.4 and A.2.5 shows that this negative relationship was greater in
the final subsample compared to the third subsample.
Overall, the implications of this estimation remains consistent with the original. The
only notable change in statistical significance occurs in the final subsample where the
coefficient for the consumption of the top 1% becomes statistically significant. However,
the standardized coefficients shows that the relative magnitude of this coefficient is very
small and negligible. In fact, the sum of the standardized coefficients for the consumption
of the top income groups is approximately 0.1283, which is only slightly lower than
the original estimation’s .1341. The standardized coefficients still show that the role
of disposable incomes in the bottom 90%’s consumption decisions declined steadily
throughout the sample, and that the role of the other variables increased. However, the
relative magnitude of disposable income are slightly higher after controlling for the CPI.
Nevertheless, the estimation results of the second robustness test are in strongly support
the original findings and their implications.
In summary, the estimation results of the two specifications used in our robustness
analysis indicate that our results are indeed robust. All three of the break dates identified
in the original estimation are robust, but the 1987Q1 and 2002Q4 breaks are more robust
than the 1994Q2 break. The results of both specifications used in our robustness analysis
confirms the notable implication that the magnitude of the standardized disposable income
coefficient undergoes a sustained decrease between 1968Q2 and 2007Q4. Furthermore,
our analysis indicates that the preference order for the components of the budget
constraint indicated by the original estimation is also robust.
92 CHAPTER 4. AN INDIRECT TWO-STEP APPROACH
4.3 Summary and Implications
The results of our VAR model indicate that the aggregate demand in the United
States is consumption-led, and increasingly so over time. In other words, during the
same period in which the labor share has been declining, the role of consumption in
determining aggregate demand growth has increased. Since we find that aggregate
demand is consumption-led and not investment-led, we follow up with an analysis of
the aggregate consumption model.
The estimation results for our final specification indicates that the role of disposable
income in determining the consumption of the bottom 90% decreases consecutively from
subsample to subsample for the entire sample. On the other hand beginning from the third
subsample (1994Q2-2007Q4) we see a rise in the influence of consumption at the top on
the bottom 90%’s consumption behavior. However, the coefficient for consumer credit
(revolving) does not become statistically significant until the final subsample (2002Q2 to
2007Q4). We interpret this as evidence supporting our hypothesis that there is an order of
preferences among the components in the budget constraint. Starting in the early 1980s
households who were facing either stagnant or falling real incomes initially increased
their consumption expenditures by reducing their savings rate (second subsample).
When households were unable to increase their consumption expenditures through
increasing their average consumption propensity they would increase their consumption
expenditures by consuming out of their savings (third subsample). Households only begin
to use credit in the financing of consumption after their savings are depleted (subsample
4).
We interpret the combination of the findings from the two models as an indication
that aggregate demand in United States is wage-led. However, since the 1990s growth
has become increasingly dependent on non-wage and non-profit variables as well.
Specifically, we find that growth in the 1990s was characterized by a wage-led regime
that was supplemented by dissavings. Then in the 2000s growth became characterized by
a wage-led regime that was supplemented by consumer credit. Therefore, even though
growth is still wage-led, due to the fact that real wages for the majority or American
households are either stagnating or falling, growth has become increasingly dependent
on the deleveraging of the bottom 90%. This indicates that economic growth in the
post-crisis period requires either growth in the disposable income of the bottom 90%
or a combination of further dissavings and increasing use of consumer credit. However,
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since savings were depleted in the 1990s our findings indicate that meaningful economic
growth in the post-crisis period will necessitates either a reversal of the trends in both
the functional and personal distribution of income that began in the early 1980s or a
continuation of the debt-fueled consumption growth of the 2000s.
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
The objective of this senior project has been to investigate the macroeconomic
consequences of changes in both the functional and personal distribution of income.
The analysis towards tis goal began with identifying two theoretical paradoxes that are
present in existing macroeconomic growth model. Specifically, the constant distribution
of income that is featured in the Harrod-Domar and Solow growth models, and the
inconsistency between the theoretical implications of the Post-Kaleckian growth model
and reality.
To circumvent the conundrums we investigated various specifications of the consumption
function, and devised a new consumption function based on the social dynamics of
consumption (RIH) and the role of consumer borrowing. Chapter 3 presented an
economic investigation of our extended consumption function with the primary findings
being that, without government intervention, a declining labor share in conjunction with
worsening income inequality can result in one of four possible outcomes: unstable
growth, sluggish growth, stagnation and economic contraction. Our theoretical narrative
is outlined by the following flow chart,
Flowchart: Theoretical Narrative
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Our empirical work was based on the insights of our theoretical model, and uses original
measures. Specifically, in our empirical analysis we disaggregate total disposable income
and consumption using methods that are, to our knowledge, both unique and original.
Our results indicate that aggregate demand in United States is wage-led, buthas become
increasingly dependent on household debt. Specifically, we find that growth in the 1990s
was characterized by a wage-led regime that was supplemented by dissavings, which
in the 2000s, transitioned into a wage-led regime supplemented by consumer credit.
Therefore, even though growth is still wage-led, the consequence of a declining labor
share is that growth has become increasingly dependent on the financial deleveraging of
the bottom 90%.
In a sense our work relates to the works of political economists who, as Ricardo would
say, emphasize that “[income distribution] is the principle problem”, and that power
relations are at the core of inequality. As such, our findings support the conclusions of
economists such as Atkinson (1999) and Piety (2015) to bring income distribution back
in from the cold and to place the debate in terms of income, or wealth, inequality.
Accordingly, our work on the implications that the changes to the functional and
personal distribution of income have on macroeconomic growth and stability is closest
in spirit and findings to Bowles and Boyer (1995), Hein and Vogal (2007) and Onaran,
Stockhammer, and Grafl (2011). Like the aforementioned studies, the results of our
study show that aggregate demand in the United States is primarily wage-led. However,
unlike prior studies, our results show evidence that aggregate demand, while wage-led, is
becoming increasing dependent on household debt.
Additionally, our work on the relationships between income inequality, debt and
household consumption behavior is closest in spirit and findings to Barba and Pivetti
(2009), Cynamon and Fazzari (2014), Cynamon, Fazzari and Setterfield (2013),
Iacoviello (2008), Kumhof and Rancie`re, Kumhof, et al. (2013), Palley (2010) and
Papadimitriou, et al. (2014). However, even though the implications of our findings
are in line with the aforementioned studies, our methods and interpretation differ from
those previously used. Moreover, the method of interpretation employs a synthesis of
microeconomic and macroeconomic theories. Conversely, the interpretation used in prior
studies were either exclusively microeconomic or exclusively macroeconomic.
However, this study has only scratched the surface as there are numerous avenues for
future research. Some of the possabitlies for future research include:
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• The consumption function of top income groups (our study focuses on the
consumption function of bottom income groups, namely the bottom 90%).
• Introducing additional controls into the consumption model, such as:
– equity extraction
– making the savings rate more prominent as a stand alone variable
• Construct VAR(W,Π, Credit) to confirm whether aggregate demand growth is
credit-led or wage-led.
• Study the implications of debt servicing cost when aggregate demand growth is
debt-dependent.
Policy Implications
The most notable policy implication that is suggested by our work here is that in
the case of the United States stable economic growth is analogous to equitable growth.
Since aggregate demand is unquestionably consumption-led, growth will only be stable
when consumption is financed solely by disposable income. Stated differently, growth
will be unstable as long as consumption is financed through debt and dissaving. Thus,
stable growth necessitated a reversal of the widening inequality and declining labor share.
However, the correct approach to reducing inequality is not so much cutting top incomes,
but rather raising the bottom. Increase income at the bottom will allow households to
reduce their reliance on debt and dissavings, and will enable them to consume out of their
disposable income.
Furthermore, our findings also indicates that government intervention is imperative in
the face of another crisis. Our theoretical model shows that, when aggregate demand
growth is debt-dependent, unless there is sufficient government intervention an initial
negative shock (crisis) could lead to a period of sustained economic contraction. After
the 2008 recession, there was a prominent shift in aggregate savings and household
indebtedness in the U.S. Thus, in the context of our model, it was thanks to timely
government intervention that prevented the U.S. economy from entering a depression.
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A. Results
A.1 Consumption-led or Investment-led in Aggregate Demand
Entire Sample: 1954Q1-2007Q4
Table A.1.1: 1954Q1 to 2007Q4 Lag Order Selection Criteria
Table A.1.2: 1954Q1-2007Q4 Granger Causality/ Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
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Table A.1.3: 1954Q1 to 2007Q4 VAR Estimation Output
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Table A.1.6: 1954Q1 to 1979Q4 VAR Estimation Output
Subsample 1:
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Table A.1.9: 1980Q1 to 2007Q4 VAR Estimation Output
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Table A.1.12: 1990Q1 to 2007Q4 VAR Estimation Output
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A.2 Aggregate Behavioral Consumption Function
Figure A.2.1: Bottom 90% Consumption Function Regression Residuals
Table A.2.1: Bottom 90% Consumption Function Estimation Results with Standardized Coefficients
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Robustness Tests
Table A.2.2: Bottom 90% Consumption Function Regression Estimation Results (Using Total Credit)
Figure A.2.2: Bottom 90% Consumption Function Regression Residuals (Controlling for CPI)
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Table A.2.3: Bottom 90% Consumption Function Estimation Results with Standardized Coefficients
(Using Total Credit)
Table A.2.4: Bottom 90% Consumption Function Regression Estimation Results (Controlling for CPI)
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